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A “SECOND MAGNA CARTA”: THE ENGLISH
HABEAS CORPUS ACT AND THE STATUTORY
ORIGINS OF THE HABEAS PRIVILEGE
Amanda L. Tyler*
“[I]f any person be restrained of his liberty . . . [,] he shall, upon demand of
his coun[sel], have a writ of habeas corpus . . . . And by . . . the habeas corpus
act, the methods of obtaining this writ are so plainly pointed out and
enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject of
England can be long detained in prison, except in those cases in which the
law requires and justifies such detainer.”
–Blackstone’s Commentaries1
© 2016 Amanda L. Tyler. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of California Berkeley School of Law. I dedicate this
Article to the memory of my brilliant federal courts professor, Daniel Meltzer, who
inspired me at every turn and was an extraordinary scholar and teacher, generous mentor,
and wonderful friend.
In working on this project, I have benefited enormously from the comments and
suggestions of participants to whom I presented earlier versions of this work at the Cornell
University Law School Constitutional Law and Theory Colloquium, the Stanford Law
School Faculty Workshop, the University of California Berkeley School of Law Public Law
and Policy Workshop, the Oxford University Law Faculty Legal History Forum, the London
School of Economics Legal and Political Theory Seminar, and the Columbia University
School of Law Courts and Legal Process Workshop. For helpful feedback on this project,
my appreciation goes to Bradford Clark, Richard Fallon, Paul Halliday, David Lieberman,
Gerard Magliocca, John Manning, Justin McCrary, Henry Monaghan, David Shapiro, and
John Yoo. I am indebted to Edna Lewis, Marci Hoffman, and I-Wei Wang of the University
of California, Berkeley Law Library, as well as the staff of the British National Archives at
Kew Gardens, the British Parliamentary Archives, and the Lincoln’s Inn Library for their
generous historical research support. I also thank Neda Khoshkhoo, Kassandra
Maldonado, James Matthew Rice, and Anuradha Sivaram for their outstanding research
assistance.
1 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131. Blackstone’s Commentaries grew out of
Blackstone’s lectures and were published between 1765 and 1769. The timing and circulation of his Commentaries meant that they wielded profound influence on the development
of early American law.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a tremendous privilege to contribute to this special issue of the Notre
Dame Law Review honoring the legacy of Daniel Meltzer’s scholarship. Dan
was, without question, a giant in our field. He was also a spectacular federal
courts professor. As one of his former students, I was lucky enough to see
him in action in the classroom. There, he was a towering figure who inspired
his students with his brilliance, good humor, and unassuming nature. His
approach to teaching fueled a deep intellectual curiosity in his students, and
he seemed to enjoy most those moments when his students challenged a proposition that he had just advanced.
As a scholar, Dan was no different. As the others writing in this issue
attest, Dan loved to engage with competing ideas—even when they were at
odds with positions that he had taken in his own scholarship. My contribution to this collection is offered in that spirit, engaging as it does with some
of Dan’s work while also challenging some of its premises.
In 2007, Dan and his longtime regular co-author, colleague, and good
friend, Richard Fallon, wrote a characteristically important and highly influential article on the common law origins of habeas corpus and their significance to modern habeas debates.2 They entitled the work Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror.3 In the article, the two
sought to promote what they called a “common law model” for tackling the
many difficult questions of the reach and content of habeas protections
implicated by the War on Terror.4 As they described it, “the Common Law
Model views courts as having a creative, discretionary function in adapting
constitutional and statutory language—which is frequently vague, and even
more frequently reflects imperfect foresight—to novel circumstances.”5
Their article contrasted “the Agency Model,” within which “courts should
regard themselves as the agents of those who enacted, or ratified, pertinent
statutory or constitutional provisions” and “should assume that those provisions were framed to be as determinate as possible.”6
In defending the Common Law Model, Fallon and Meltzer maintained
that it “has historically dominated.”7 They continued:
[A] common law approach to habeas corpus issues has been not only historically dominant, but also, for the most part, historically successful. In the
main, courts have managed to adapt generally stated norms of positive law to
evolving notions of fairness, while also accommodating the imperatives of
2 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
3 See id.
4 See id. at 2033.
5 Id.
6 Id. (observing that under the agency model courts “should minimize judicial
creativity”).
7 Id.; see also id. at 2043.
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national security and practical governance. Much of the most important
jurisdictional and substantive doctrine has been and remains judge-made.8

Fallon and Meltzer were of course right that habeas corpus has a rich and
storied common law background, as is documented well and extensively in
historian Paul Halliday’s masterful book Habeas Corpus: From England to
Empire.9 They were also right that such a model offers many attractive aspects
from a normative perspective, not the least of which is its ability to adapt to
changed circumstances and offer a framework for tackling problems with no
clear historical analogs. As this Article explores, however, in tracing the
Anglo-American development of habeas corpus jurisprudence, it is important
to account for the statutory roots of the habeas privilege as well—particularly
because statutory developments were designed in important respects to alter
and constrain the common law courts’ approach to habeas corpus.
Specifically, the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, passed by Parliament in the waning years of the Stuart dynasty, came in direct response to
perceived failings by the royal courts and their common law writ to do
enough to check executive excess at the expense of individual rights.10
Unearthing the story of the backdrop against which the Act was passed and
tracing its role in English law going forward reveals that the Act was enormously significant in the development of English law’s habeas jurisprudence—far more so than most jurists and scholars recognize today. Further,
extensive evidence of the Act’s influence across the Atlantic dating from well
before, during, and after the Revolutionary War demonstrates that much of
early American habeas law was premised upon efforts to incorporate the
Act’s key protections rather than developed through judicial innovation.
Most important of all, there is every reason to believe that the Act, along with
its suspension by Parliament on several occasions in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, established the suspension model that the Founding
generation imported into the United States Constitution’s Suspension
Clause.11 In other words, focusing exclusively on the common law writ and
its judicial origins gives insufficient attention to what was a tremendously significant factor in the development of Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence—namely, the English Habeas Corpus Act, the very object of which was
to constrain judges and harness the common law writ toward specific ends.
In concluding Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on
Terror, Fallon and Meltzer wrote that their goal in writing the article had been
8 Id. at 2044. The article also observed that “the original office of habeas corpus was
to ask whether—even in the absence of constitutional rights in the modern sense—a petitioner’s detention was authorized by law.” Id. at 2065.
9 See generally PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010).
10 See, e.g., Helen A. Nutting, The Most Wholesome Law—The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
65 AM. HIST. REV. 527, 531 (1960) (detailing the case of William Farmer and citing
sources).
11 That Clause provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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“to put war-on-terror issues that arise in habeas corpus cases into a new,
broader, and illuminating perspective.”12 The article most certainly accomplished that goal. Even more than that, in offering a framework for
approaching many hard questions that have arisen as part of the war on terrorism, Fallon and Meltzer sparked a host of new scholarly conversations on
these topics.13 Their proposed common law model, moreover, seems to have
wielded considerable influence on the Supreme Court’s approach in the
blockbuster War on Terror decision in Boumediene v. Bush.14 In Boumediene, a
five-Justice majority held that noncitizen detainees held by the United States
Government as “enemy combatants” at the Naval base at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, enjoyed the protection of the Suspension Clause.15 Further, the Court
concluded, the habeas privilege promised by that Clause required that the
detainees be afforded a right to challenge their designation and military
detention without criminal charges in an Article III court.16 The influence
of Fallon and Meltzer’s work on the majority is apparent from Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, which relied upon their article in declaring
that “common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy. Its
precise application and scope changed depending upon the
circumstances.”17
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene is emblematic of the common
law model that Fallon and Meltzer’s article promotes. The same is certainly
true for the earlier War on Terror plurality decision by Justice O’Connor in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.18 Hamdi involved a habeas petition brought on behalf of
a United States citizen challenging his long-term military detention as an
enemy combatant.19 After declaring that the proper framework for addressing his petition called for “balancing [the] serious competing interests” at
stake,20 the plurality opinion took into account a host of factors arising out of
the circumstances of the capture and detention of Hamdi. Putting these
together, the plurality concluded that Hamdi was entitled to a hearing with
streamlined procedures to challenge his designation; at the same time, however, the plurality rejected his argument that his detention was categorically
unconstitutional.21 For Fallon and Meltzer, Justice O’Connor’s approach
12 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2112.
13 A recent Westlaw search found over 100 citations to the article in legal journals and
law reviews.
14 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
15 See id. at 732.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 779–80 (citing Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2102).
18 542 U.S. 507 (2004). I return to discuss Hamdi in greater depth below. See infra
Part VII.
19 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
20 Id. at 529 (plurality opinion).
21 See id. at 519 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an
enemy combatant.”).
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struck a chord with the common law tradition of habeas corpus and validated
the merits of the common law model.22
In my own scholarship, Fallon and Meltzer’s work on habeas models
prompted me to dig deeper into the historical backdrop that informed ratification of the Suspension Clause and think harder about the relevance of that
history for questions of constitutional interpretation. This, in turn, has
spurred work that has occupied me for many years since.23 In the spirit of
engaging with my federal courts professor one more time, this Article tells
the story of the statutory origins of the habeas privilege—what Blackstone
called a “second magna carta”24—and argues that any explication of the constitutional privilege and discussion of how courts should address modern Suspension Clause questions should account for the critical role that the English
Habeas Corpus Act played in the development of Anglo-American habeas
jurisprudence.
I. THE ENGLISH HABEAS CORPUS ACT IN
LEGAL TRADITION

THE

ANGLO-AMERICAN

The story of the writ of habeas corpus in Anglo-American jurisprudence
is a complicated one. Part of the problem lies in the fact that historically,
English law recognized both a common law and a statutory writ of habeas
corpus.25 The former, judicially created, was at its origins a prerogative writ
that enabled the royal courts to act as an arm of the king in “demand[ing an]
account for his subject who is restrained of his liberty.”26 The statutory writ,
by contrast, was the product of parliamentary efforts to constrain the executive’s authority.27 Much of modern American habeas scholarship has downplayed the role of the statutory writ in the development of American habeas
jurisprudence, but as I have detailed in other work, the English Habeas
Corpus Act played a central role in that very development, wielding extensive
influence over early American law. Indeed, no less than Blackstone, in the
1765 publication of his law lectures that were read by virtually every early
22 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2036 (“applaud[ing]” the plurality’s approach
in Hamdi).
23 See, e.g., AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS GOES TO WAR: TRACING THE STORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION’S HABEAS PRIVILEGE FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author).
24 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *133.
25 See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 611–12 (2008).
26 HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 65. Historian Paul Halliday’s work masterfully tells the
story of this development. As Halliday recounts, in 1619, Chief Justice Henry Montagu
described habeas corpus as a “writ of the prerogative by which the king demands account
for his subject who is restrained of his liberty.” Id. (quoting Habeas Corpus al CinquePorts put un Borne Imprison La (1619) 81 Eng. Rep. 975).
27 See Nutting, supra note 10, at 531–32.
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American studying law, glorified the Habeas Corpus Act as a “bulwark” of
“per[s]onal liberty” and a “second magna carta.”28
In other work, I have explored the profound influence of the English
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 on the development of Anglo-American habeas
law and the Suspension Clause in particular.29 This important English statute, glorified in the pages of Blackstone for serving as a powerful check on
executive authority, led Parliament to invent the concept of suspension in
order to displace its protections in times of war and threats to the throne.30
This uneasy conceptual pairing of the Act’s protections and their suspension
in times of crisis created a model that came to govern on both sides of the
Atlantic during the American Revolutionary War.31 The very same model
came to be imported into the early American jurisprudence that developed
in the immediate wake of the Declaration of Independence and ultimately
provided the basis on which the Founding generation constitutionalized protections against suspension of the privilege in the United States Constitution’s habeas provision, the Suspension Clause.32
Notwithstanding Blackstone’s glorification of the Act, modern debates
concerning the protections given and limits imposed by the Suspension
Clause have taken place largely without reference to the role that the Act has
played in the development of Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence.33
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has repeatedly embraced a methodological
approach in cases involving the Suspension Clause—including a prominent
recent case arising out of the war on terrorism34—which openly calls for
careful attention to the historical backdrop against which the Clause was
drafted.35 The Court’s emphasis on the importance of history in this context
follows from the fact that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was part
28 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *126, *131, *133. Blackstone’s Commentaries grew
out of Blackstone’s lectures and were published between 1765 and 1769.
29 See generally TYLER, supra note 23; Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American
Revolution, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 635 (2015).
30 See Tyler, supra note 29, at 644.
31 For details on the Revolutionary War period, consult id. (detailing the suspension of
the privilege applicable to American Rebels that was adopted and extended by Parliament
throughout the war); see also Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension
Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 955–68 (2012) (detailing the suspensions that occurred in
the states during the Revolutionary War).
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For details on the early American adoption of the
protections associated with the English Habeas Corpus Act and the concept of suspension,
as well as the influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act on the drafting of the Suspension Clause, see generally TYLER, supra note 23; Tyler, supra note 31, at 954–75.
33 A prominent exception may be found in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which he was joined by Justice Stevens
in emphasizing the Act’s importance in the development of the constitutional privilege.
See id. at 557–58.
34 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (positing that “‘at the absolute
minimum,’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution
was drafted and ratified” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001))).
35 See id.
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of the Anglo-American legal tradition long before the drafting and ratification of the United States Constitution.36 As Chief Justice John Marshall once
observed, when the Founding generation constitutionalized “this great writ,”
they invoked “[t]he term . . . in the [C]onstitution, as one which was well
understood.”37 Thus, although some may question whether history should
be determinative in resolving the many difficult questions that arise today
regarding the proper interpretation and application of the Suspension
Clause, few deny that history is highly relevant to the analysis of such
questions.38
Those who wrote the Constitution were keenly aware of the long and
celebrated role of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in English law.
Translated as “to undergo and receive” the “corpus,” or body, of the prisoner, the writ was by its origins a judicial creation and served as the basis for
courts to demand cause for a prisoner’s detention from his jailer. As historian Paul Halliday’s work shows, the common law writ came into regular use
in the seventeenth century as a “prerogative writ”—that is, as the embodiment of royal power invoked by the Court of King’s Bench in aid of the
Crown’s obligation to look after his subjects.39 For the writ to evolve into
something that would override the royal command as sufficient cause for
detention would take additional developments. Specifically, it would take the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, a parliamentary creation intended to
complement the common law writ and constrain the Crown from detaining
outside the criminal process. Parliament’s adoption of the Habeas Corpus
Act was but one aspect of the rise of parliamentary supremacy and played a
major role in a broader parliamentary effort to wrestle control over matters
of detention from the king and his courts.40
This Article tells the story of that effort and its culmination in Parliament’s adoption of the English Habeas Corpus Act by drawing upon a wealth
of sources, including archival documents, parliamentary debates, diaries and
private papers of key participants, and significant decisions and rulings of the
royal courts. As the pages that follow show, with the Act’s passage, Parliament finally controlled and defined what constituted legal cause to detain.41
In the process, the royal command ceased to suffice as good cause. But in
the face of war and Jacobite threats to retake the throne, Parliament soon
created a distinct tool for setting aside the Act’s protections—namely, suspension.42 In a series of suspensions spanning from the late seventeenth century
through the eighteenth century, Parliament set aside the Habeas Corpus Act
36 See id.
37 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830).
38 For greater discussion of the significance of history in interpreting the Suspension
Clause, see Tyler, supra note 31, at 918–23.
39 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 65.
40 See generally E.R. Turner, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 1603–1760, 34 ENG. HIST.
REV. 172, 172 (1919).
41 See infra Part III.
42 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 170–73.
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and all related legal protections in order to legalize arrests made outside the
criminal process, arrests that otherwise would have resulted in discharge of
the prisoner under the terms of the Habeas Corpus Act.43
The Founding generation knew a great deal concerning the benefits
provided by the Act—indeed, denial of the Act’s protections to the colonists
constituted a major complaint about British rule and contributed to the
movement for independence.44 Well-steeped in their Blackstone, the colonists read about how the Act was a “bulwark” of “personal liberty” and a “second magna carta.”45 Unsurprisingly, they wanted to enjoy the benefits of this
second Magna Carta for themselves.
In reviewing this important period in history, it bears highlighting at the
outset that although without question over time habeas corpus would come
to be associated with the protection of individual liberty, at its origins, habeas
corpus was about power.46 Specifically, the Habeas Corpus Act was caught up
in the struggles between Parliament and the crown that dominated the better
part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.47 Thus, although much of
what follows here tells a story wrapped up in the language of individual
rights, the Act must be viewed as part of a larger movement away from the
royal absolutism that defined early periods in English history. Further, as will
be shown, Blackstone’s glorification notwithstanding, at its origins, the
Habeas Corpus Act was an imperfect safeguard of personal liberty. Indeed,
after the Act’s adoption, Parliament wielded its attainder power aggressively
to circumvent the Act and detain persons without formal process.48 Further,
just ten years after passing the Act, Parliament invented the concept of suspension to displace its protections.49 In short, Parliament did not itself
always adhere to the constraints it had imposed on the executive’s authority
to detain through the Habeas Corpus Act.
Nonetheless, it is during the important decades chronicled here that the
seeds of the association of habeas corpus with individual liberty were sown by
the likes of Coke and Selden and with Parliament’s adoption of the English
Habeas Corpus Act. In time, with the birth of a new country across the Atlantic and its constitutional framework that enshrined the privilege and provided for independent courts, the protections associated with the Habeas
Corpus Act would finally warrant Blackstone’s praise.

43 See Halliday & White, supra note 25, at 624–25.
44 See Tyler, supra note 31, at 954–57.
45 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *126, *131, *133. Blackstone’s Commentaries grew
out of Blackstone’s lectures and were published between 1765 and 1769.
46 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of parliamentary
supremacy leading up to the period in which Parliament adopted the Act).
47 See generally Halliday & White, supra note 25, at 620–24.
48 See Tyler, supra note 29, at 697 n.286.
49 See Tyler, supra note 31, at 934.
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PRIVILEGE

Modern accounts often tie the origins of the writ of habeas corpus to
those of Magna Carta—the “Great Charter of the Liberties of England”—
sealed by King John on a field at Runnymede in 1215.50 Chapter 39 of the
Great Charter declared, “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land.”51
Like almost every major development in the story of the privilege, the
Great Charter emerged from a period of unrest and civil war in England. It
represented a bargain of sorts between rebelling English nobility and King
John, who was to remain in power in exchange for recognizing the liberties
set forth in the compact.52 The concept of due process, so important to
modern Anglo-American civil liberties jurisprudence, may be grounded in
the declarations set forth in Chapter 39 of Magna Carta.53
Picking up the story in the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke’s
highly influential Institutes on the Law of England specifically connected Chapter 39 with the writ of habeas corpus, positing: “Now it may be demanded, if a
man be taken, or committed to prison contra legem terrae, against the law of
the land, what remedy hath the party grieved?”54 To this, he answered: “He
50 See Halliday & White, supra note 25, at 582 n.13.
51 GREAT CHARTER OF LIBERTIES, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 42, 47 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens
eds., MacMillan & Co. 1929) (1901) [hereinafter GREAT CHARTER OF LIBERTIES]. With the
remaking of the Great Charter in 1225, Chapter 39 became Chapter 29. I refer to the
relevant chapter throughout by its original numbering.
52 Within weeks of the events at Runnymede, the Pope instructed King John to repudiate the Charter, and John was dead by the end of the next year. Various monarchs issued
several revised versions of Magna Carta over the remaining years of the thirteenth century,
including two prominent issuances in 1225 by Henry III and 1297 by Edward I. See Vincent
R. Johnson, The Ancient Magna Carta and the Modern Rule of Law: 1215 to 2015, 47 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 1, 11–13 (2015).
53 For example, “by the end of the 14th century ‘due process of law’ and ‘law of the
land’ were interchangeable” in English legal vocabulary. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 169 (1968); see also DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 1–38 (1966) (connecting these concepts to modern due process
principles and the writ of habeas corpus generally).
54 See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 54
(6th ed. London, W. Rawlins 1681) (1628) [hereinafter 2 INSTITUTES]. It would be hard to
overstate the influential nature of Coke, who had served as Attorney General under Elizabeth and Chief Justice under James I, on the development of English and American law.
For much of the period following its publication, Coke’s work served as the “lawyer’s primer” and heavily influenced developments in English law. See HASTINGS LYON & HERMAN
BLOCK, EDWARD COKE: ORACLE OF THE LAW 346 (1929); see also Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to Coke on Littleton, in LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS
OF SIR EDWARD COKE 24 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004). Further, “Coke’s Institutes were read in
the American colonies by virtually every student of the law” and “seem[ed] to be almost the
foundation of [American] law.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967) (first
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may have an habeas corpus [action].”55 Presiding over a habeas case on King’s
Bench, Chief Justice Coke added: “By the law of God, none ought to be
imprisoned, but with the cause expressed.”56 The narrative that has emerged
to describe this early view of habeas corpus goes something like this: the writ
of habeas corpus was designed to ensure that a prisoner receives the due
process promised by the Great Charter, which in turn demanded that a jailor
present legal cause for a prisoner’s detention. This was the function of the
common law writ, specifically the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et
recipiendum, which translates as “to undergo and receive” the “corpus,” or
body, of the prisoner. Courts used other common law writs of habeas corpus
to compel the appearance of witnesses, move prisoners around, and demand
responses in civil proceedings.
But the story of the privilege as it came to America is far more complex
than this simplistic account reveals, in large measure because of the important influence that the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 wielded upon the
development of early American law and the limits that the common law writ
encountered during the decades immediately preceding the Act’s passage.
Indeed, as is explored below, in the century leading up to the Act, royal command commonly sufficed to constitute sufficient cause for detention or, at
the least, to preclude judicial inquiry into the same. But the privilege that
came to be enshrined in the United States Constitution—grounded as it was
upon the protections associated with the English Act—was not simply the
embodiment of a promise of some process before a tribunal only to meet
defeat in the face of executive command. Instead, the habeas privilege born
out of the English Act constituted a far more significant check on the power
of the executive to arrest and detain. As will be seen, the privilege associated
with the Act and imported into the American legal tradition functioned to
limit dramatically the causes for which the executive could legally detain persons who could claim the protection of domestic law.57 Specifically, the Act
required that one be charged criminally and proceeded against in due
course—even in times of war—and it rejected outright the proposition that
the royal command, standing alone, sufficed as lawful cause to detain.58
It was, of course, not always so. For example, the return in Darnel’s
Case59 in 1627—sometimes called the “Case of the Five Knights”—stated
citing CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 157–87 (1911); MEADOR, supra
note 53, at 23–24, then quoting CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552–1634), at 514 (1957) (quoting South Carolina Governor and later Supreme Court Justice, John Rutledge)). Roscoe Pound once
deemed Coke “the oracle of the common law.” ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 94 (1930).
55 2 INSTITUTES, supra note 54.
56 Codd v. Turback (1615) 81 Eng. Rep. 94.
57 See infra Part VII.
58 For a discussion, see Tyler, supra note 31, at 924–27.
59 Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1 (Eng.). The knights were Sir Thomas
Darnel, Sir John Corbet, Sir Walter Earl, Sir John Heveningham, and Sir Edmund
Hampden. Id.; see also J.A. Guy, The Origins of the Petition of Right Reconsidered, 25 HIST. J.
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nothing more than that the prisoners were held “per speciale mandatum Domini
Regis”—in other words, by the special command of the King.60 When Parliament refused to fund King Charles I’s plans for continued English participation in the Thirty Years’ War, he demanded that the rich nobles of England
“loan” him money to support his military objectives.61 When several knights
refused the forced loans, Charles had them thrown in London’s Fleet
Prison.62 Represented by some of the English bar’s finest, the nobles petitioned the Court of King’s Bench, the judges of which served at the pleasure
of the King, for writs of habeas corpus to win their release.63 The central
question posed by their case concerned whether the King’s vacuous return
would suffice as lawful cause for their imprisonment.64
The knights’ counsel attacked the position that the royal command on
its own represented the law of the land, or “legem terrae,” contemplated by
Magna Carta.65 Celebrated parliamentarian, lawyer, and legal scholar John
Selden developed this argument most fully on behalf of the knights.66 Referencing Chapter 39 of the Great Charter, Selden asserted that “if it were fully
executed as it ought to be, every man would enjoy his liberty better than he
doth.”67 He continued: “The law saith expressly, ‘No freeman shall be
imprisoned without due process of the law.’”68 Although recognizing that
the words “legem terrae” could be interpreted to permit the King’s return to
stand, Selden contended that there were limits on what should be granted
the force of law in justifying detention.69 Specifically, Selden argued that the
best interpretation of Magna Carta posited that “[n]o freeman shall be
imprisoned without due process of the law”70—which he defined as comprising “due course of law, to be either by presentment or by indictment.”71 In
289–91 (1982) (detailing the case). As Halliday notes, Sir Thomas Darnel “had made his
submission and been released before arguments” in the case. HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at
392 n.3.
60 See MEADOR, supra note 53, at 13–14.
61 Id. at 13.
62 See id.
63 The jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench reached so-called “pleas of the
crown”—that is, most of the cases that involved the crown in some manner. As noted,
during this period, its judges were paid by the king and served at his pleasure. See Douglass
C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 813 (1989).
64 See id.
65 See Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1, 17–18 (Eng.).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 18 (argument of Selden before King’s Bench). Selden represented Sir
Edmund Hampden. See Guy, supra note 59, at 293 n.15.
68 Darnel’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 18 (paraphrasing from the GREAT CHARTER OF
LIBERTIES, supra note 51, at ch. 39).
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 Id. Discussing Darnel’s Case, Professor Daniel Meador notes with insight equally
applicable today: “The case is also noteworthy because it shows how the writ of habeas
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so arguing, Selden equated due process with the specific process governing
the initiation of formal criminal charges.72
Selden’s argument was not entirely without support. Indeed, almost
three hundred years earlier during the reign of Edward III and in conjunction with adoption of the treason statute that governed for many centuries,
Parliament had essentially embraced the very same proposition when it
declared:
Whereas it is contained in the Great Charter . . . that none shall be imprisoned nor put out of his Freehold, nor of his Franchises nor free Custom,
unless it be by the Law of the Land; It is accorded assented, and stablished,
That from henceforth none shall be taken by Petition or Suggestion made to
our Lord the King, or to his Council, unless it be by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful People of the same neighbourhood where such
Deeds be done, in due Manner, or by Process made by Writ original at the
Common Law . . . and forejudged of the same by the Course of the
Law . . . .73

Selden invoked this statute and others to challenge head on the idea that the
King’s word alone constituted the law of the land.74
But the argument was countered forcefully by Attorney General Sir Robert Heath, who defended the King’s authority to imprison the knights.
Heath conceded that Magna Carta “is the foundation of [English] Liberties.”75 But any definition of “legem terrae,” Heath argued, must recognize
that:
[Th]e king is the head of the same fountain of justice, which your lordship
administers to all his subjects; all justice is derived from him, and what he
doth, he doth not as a private person, but as the head of the common
wealth, as justiciarius regni, yea, the very essence of justice under God upon
earth is in him . . . .76

Heath continued by all but labeling Selden’s arguments fanciful, at one
point asserting that “no learned man” would agree with the assertion that “no
man should be committed, but first he shall be indicted or presented.”77
Then, after offering a lengthy recitation of why the statutes and precedents
relied upon by the knights did not support their position, Heath defended
the king’s power to detain prisoners for state reasons.78 He concluded in
turn by drawing upon a wealth of precedents and current practices supportcorpus is no greater protector of liberty than the judges’ view as to what constitutes lawful
custody.” MEADOR, supra note 53, at 18.
72 See Darnel’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 18.
73 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 4 (1351) (Eng.).
74 See Darnel’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 18.
75 Id. at 38 (argument of Heath before King’s Bench).
76 Id. at 37.
77 Id. at 38.
78 See id. at 49.
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ing the position that the command of the king constituted the law of the
land.79
All involved appreciated the momentousness of the case. During arguments, Lord Doderidge, one of the Justices on King’s Bench, declared: “This
is the greatest cause that ever I knew in this court.”80 Similarly, Lord Chief
Justice Hyde labeled the case “of very great weight and expectation.”81 In the
end, however, Cobbett’s State Trials version of the proceedings reports that
King’s Bench viewed the precedents as supporting the King, concluding that
the King’s word constituted the “law of the land,” and therefore justified the
prisoners’ remand to the Fleet.82 For their release, they would have to look
elsewhere—specifically, to the very person who had thrown them in prison in
the first instance. In the words of Chief Justice Hyde, “we make no doubt but
the king, if you seek to him, he knowing the cause why you are imprisoned,
he will have mercy.”83
King’s Bench may well have reached a different result in the matter,
given that the King had removed its Chief Justice, Randolph Crewe, the previous year reportedly because Crewe had shown “no zeal for the advancement
of the Loan[s].”84 More specifically, some reports suggest that Crewe had
also informed the King through intermediaries that he believed that “no tax
. . . can be laid upon the people without the authority of parliament, and that
the King cannot imprison any of his subjects without a warrant specifying the
offense with which they are charged.”85 Of course, if Crewe did hold this
79 Id. at 38–50. As Paul Halliday observes, justices of the peace and other special commissioners still enjoyed summary powers to imprison during this period. See HALLIDAY,
supra note 9, at 138.
80 Darnel’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 31.
81 Id. at 50.
82 Id. at 59. As scholars have noted, there was considerable contemporary debate on
whether the decisions created precedent or merely constituted a non-precedential refusal
of bail to the knights. See Guy, supra note 59, at 289–94; Mark Kishlansky, Tyranny Denied:
Charles I, Attorney General Heath, and the Five Knights’ Case, 42 HIST. J. 53, 63–64 (1999)
(emphasizing that the case turned on the knights’ first return filed and therefore did not
necessarily resolve questions going to perpetual detention). J.A. Guy concludes that the
case records had been altered by royal counsel in an effort to bolster their precedential
value, see Guy, supra note 59, at 296–99, but Mark Kishlansky has countered that view
forcefully, see Kishlansky, supra, at 64–67.
83 Darnel’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 59.
84 Id. at 1; see also T. WORTHINGTON BARLOW, CHESHIRE: ITS HISTORICAL AND LITERARY
ASSOCIATIONS 45–48 (Manchester, John Gray Bell 1855) (discussing Crewe and replicating
a letter written by him discussing his dismissal).
85 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 307 (Phila.,
Blanchard & Lea 1851); see also 1 THOMAS BIRCH, THE COURT AND TIMES OF CHARLES THE
FIRST 168–70 (London, Henry Colburn 1849) (replicating correspondence dating to 1626
describing the events); THE JOURNAL OF SIR SIMONDS D’EWES 124 (Wallace Notestein ed.,
1923) (replicating MP D’Ewes’ journal noting that a motion was made in 1640 to have
Crewe testify as to why he had been “putt out of his place” as part of parliamentary investigations into the judges who had supported the King in the Ship-Money case). For more on
Ship-Money, see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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view, Selden’s arguments would have met sympathetic ears. It seems that
Crewe’s dismissal may well have sealed the Knights’ respective fates. This
being said, many historians suggest that the case made perfect sense in terms
of accepted “contemporary legal justification[s]” for detention86 and a
wealth of precedents.87
And so, Selden’s argument did not prevail on this occasion. He therefore took his cause to another forum—Parliament—enlisting the support of
fellow House of Commons member and great English jurist Sir Edward Coke,
among others, in the process.88 Parliament adopted the Petition of Right the
following year, but only after extensive debates that pitted Selden and Coke
against Heath once more.89 Coke’s remarks during the debates shed considerable light on his view of the law. Coke began by invoking Saint Paul, quoting the Acts of the Apostles for the idea that “[i]t is against reason to send a
man to prison without shewing a cause.”90 Turning to the specific problem
posed by the Case of the Five Knights, Coke argued that if a detention be
upheld
per mandatum domini regis, or ‘for matter of state’ . . . then we are gone, and
we are in a worse case than ever. If we agree to this imprisonment ‘for matters of state’ and ‘a convenient time,’ we shall leave Magna Carta and the
other statutes and make them fruitless, and do what our ancestors would
never do.91

Notably, here Coke argued that the law already denied the king the power to
detain for “state reasons” absent specific cause, yet he also promoted the Petition as going further to clarify the point.92
Given its impetus, it is hardly surprising that the Petition essentially
embraced Selden’s arguments from the Case of the Five Knights and repudi86 HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 138, 222–23; see also id. at 156–60 (elaborating on the
king’s discretion and prerogative).
87 See Kishlansky, supra note 82, at 70, 73, 78–79.
88 See id. at 55–56.
89 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 139.
90 Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1, 69 (Eng.) (remarks of Sir Edward Coke);
see also id. at 78 (same). Note that Coke had not always held this view. He had once
opined that the Privy Council had the power to commit without citing a cause. In discussing his earlier remarks while promoting the Petition of Right, Coke said they were made
“by some young student that did mistake” and declared: “I have now better guides.” 2
COMMONS DEBATES 1628, 190–93, 213 (Robert C. Johnson & Mary Frear Keeler eds., 1977)
[hereinafter COMMONS DEBATES] (remarks of Sir Edward Coke given Mar. 29 & 31, 1628).
As counsel for the Earl of Shaftsbury later argued in 1677, in Coke’s “more mature age he
was of another opinion, and accordingly the law is declared in the Petition of Right.” See
The Case of the Earl of Shaftsbury (1677) 6 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1269, 1285 (Eng.); see also
HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 30 (noting that release rates for prisoners dropped during
Coke’s tenure on King’s Bench).
91 3 COMMONS DEBATES, supra note 90, at 95 (remarks of Sir Edward Coke given Apr.
26, 1628).
92 For details on the Petition and why Coke sought to cloak it in existing law, see
ROGER LOCKYER, THE EARLY STUARTS 336–45 (1989).
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ated King’s Bench’s resolution of the matter.93 Specifically, after quoting
Chapter 39 of the original version of Magna Carta—the Petition set forth the
following grievance and demand:
[Y]our subjects have of late been imprisoned without any cause shewed: And
when for their deliverance they were brought before your justices by your
Majesties writts of habeas corpus . . . , no cause was certified, but that they
were deteined by your Majesties speciall comaund signified by the lords of
your privie councell, and yet were returned backe to severall prisons without
being charged with any thing to which they might make aunswere according
to the lawe . . . . They . . . pray . . . that no freeman in any such manner as is
before mencioned be imprisoned or deteined.94

The Petition also responded more broadly to the events that had preceded
Darnel’s Case by, among other things, purporting to restrict declarations of
martial law, ban forced quartering of soldiers, and prohibit unilateral taxation by the king.95 It was, in this respect, very much a repudiation of
Charles’s attempts to govern without Parliament and therefore embedded
within the power struggle between Parliament and the monarchy that came
to define much of seventeenth-century England.96
A king increasingly at odds with his Parliament, Charles I had resisted
initial efforts to enact portions of what became the Petition of Right in the
form of legislation. Under Coke’s leadership, however, the House of Commons moved ahead with the Petition in order to register its grievances. The
King reluctantly accepted the Petition, presumably with the intention of
securing greater parliamentary support for his military objectives going forward.97 Within a year, however, the King was once again at war with the
Houses over his demand for taxes of tonnage and poundage, which Parliament had denied him in contrast to his predecessors.98 As part of this longstanding dispute, Charles dissolved Parliament yet again.99 It would be
decades before the Petition would evolve from mere aspiration to push the
law in the direction of limiting the monarch’s authority to detain, in part due

93 These and other efforts led John Milton to refer to Selden as “the chief of learned
men reputed in this Land.” JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Richard C. Jebb ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1918) (1644). For more on the origins of the Petition and the parliamentary
debates, see Linda S. Popofsky, Habeas Corpus and “Liberty of the Subject”: Legal Arguments for
the Petition of Right in the Parliament of 1628, 41 HISTORIAN 257 (1979).
94 The Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1, c. 1, §§ 5, 8 (Eng.).
95 Id. §§ 1, 6, 7.
96 For an overview of the economic context of this struggle, consult North & Weingast,
supra note 63, at 808–24.
97 3 HL JOUR. (1628) 842–44 (Eng.). Among other things, Charles I had pledged
support to his uncle, Christian IV of Denmark, in the ongoing wars on the Continent.
98 Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1101
(2009).
99 For details, see id. at 1101–12 (2009); Linda S. Popofsky, The Crisis over Tonnage and
Poundage in Parliament in 1629, 126 PAST & PRESENT 44 (1990).
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to the debatable legal status of the Petition itself.100 Indeed, as if to drive
home the point that the Petition had changed little, Charles I threw John
Selden and eight other members of Parliament in the Tower of London in
1629 in response to their open opposition to the King’s actions.101 Some in
the group had prevented the House speaker, John Finch, from leaving his
chair so as to adjourn the Commons in keeping with the King’s command
but over the protest of its members.102 Among this group was Sir John Eliot,
a regular foe of Charles, who had led a campaign against the right of the
King to levy tonnage and poundage and promoted the Petition of Right.103
It was not Eliot’s first visit to the Tower, but it would be his last.
When Selden and the other prisoners went before King’s Bench to seek
their freedom via writs of habeas corpus, Attorney General Heath responded
with a flurry of arguments against bailing the prisoners.104 First, he cited
backdated royal warrants as cause for imprisonment.105 Second, he argued
that “[a] Petition in parliament is not a law” and thereby denied any legal
effect to the Petition of Right.106 It followed that, under this view, the royal
100 During this period, Parliament differentiated between bills that became statutes and
petitions. The latter, particularly “petitions of right,” were viewed as the appropriate
means for “addressing the crown on matters of prerogative, as a way of offering counsel,
and of presenting grievances.” Elizabeth Read Foster, Petitions and the Petition of Right, 14 J.
BRIT. STUD. 21, 27 (1974). With respect to the Petition of Right presented to King Charles
in 1628, there is reason to think that some members of Parliament viewed it as declaring
the state of existing law, and thereby hoped to bind judges to the same recognition by
securing the King’s assent. See E.R. Adair, Historical Revisions: XIV—The Petition of Right, 5
HISTORY 99, 101 (n.s. 1920); Foster, supra, at 43. As noted, the petition followed failed
efforts to pass a bill encompassing many of the same terms. See Foster, supra, at 26. Further, although parliamentary adoption of the Petition of Right followed some of the standard procedures for passage of a statute (including witnessing the requisite number of
readings in both Houses of Parliament), it did not comply with all such procedures and the
terms of King Charles’ assent were distinct from those that he gave to bills having the force
of statutes. See Adair, supra, at 102. Accordingly, as explained in the text, it took additional statutory developments for the grievances set forth in the Petition to become binding law. It follows that English historian Henry Hallam’s claim that the Petition of Right
plainly established that “no freeman could be detained in prison, except upon a criminal
charge or conviction, or for a civil debt” gives too much effect to the Petition standing
alone. HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE ACCESSION OF
HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II 475 (William Smith ed., New York, Harper & Bros.
1880) (1827).
101 See generally 2 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1629) cols. 513–25.
102 See Chafetz, supra note 98, at 1110–11 (detailing Finch affair (citing 2 Parl. Hist.
Eng. (1628) cols. 490–91)). When Parliament reconvened in 1629, the House of Commons resolved that Finch had committed “a breach of Privilege of the house” by failing “to
obey the commands of the house.” Stroud’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. (1629) 235, 293–94
(Eng.). Later that year, the Long Parliament ordered reparations to several of the prisoners. See id. at 293–94, 310–15.
103 See generally Parl. Hist. Eng. (1628) cols. 488–90.
104 See Stroud’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 280–82.
105 See id. at 281.
106 See id.
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command sufficed as legal cause.107 Finally, the Attorney General levied general accusations of treasonous conduct.108 In response, Edward Littleton
countered on behalf of Selden (with his client’s able assistance) that the Petition of Right was both enforceable and had changed the state of the law,
making the case very simple. As he put it, “[t]o detain the prisoner by the
command of the king singly, is against the Petition of Right.”109 Littleton
spoke with some authority on the topic, having played a significant role in
the Commons’ drafting of the grievances set forth in the Petition. In Littleton’s view, the Petition requires that “out of the Return, the substance of
the offence ought always to appear . . . [and provide] cause upon which any
indictment might be drawn up.”110 Following the levying of formal criminal
charges, moreover, Littleton understood the Petition to guarantee that the
prisoner “shall have his trial.”111 It followed, Littleton concluded, that if the
King had true cause to believe treason was afoot, the proper procedure was
to indict the prisoners on charges, not detain them on the sole basis of royal
command.112
Once again, Selden’s attack on the king’s authority to detain outside the
criminal process would fail, but not without garnering some legal traction.
There was drama, as well. One chronicler of the period reports:
When the Court was ready to have delivered their Opinions in this great
business, the Prisoners were not brought to the bar, according to the rule of
the court. Therefore proclamation was made for the Keepers of the several
prisons to bring in their Prisoners; but none of them appeared, except the
Marshal of the King’s-Bench, who informed the Court, that [a prisoner] . . .
in his custody, was removed yesterday, and put in the Tower of London by
the king’s own warrant: and so it was done with the other prisoners; for each
of them was removed out of his prison [and put in the Tower by royal
warrant] . . . .113

Why had the King removed all the prisoners to the Tower? As another
writer of the period, Bulstrode Whitelocke (whose father served on King’s
Bench during the case) recorded:
The Judges were somewhat perplexed about the Habeas Corpus for the Parliament-men, and wrote an humble and stout Letter to the king, “That by
their oaths they were to bail the Prisoners; but thought fit, before they did it,
107 See id. at 281–82.
108 See generally id. at 235–97; John Reeve, The Arguments in King’s Bench in 1629 Concerning the Imprisonment of John Selden and Other Members of the House of Commons, 25 J. BRIT. STUD.
264, 264–87 (1986). Heath asserted that the Petition did not apply to petitioners’ cause,
while elsewhere stating that “the king intends to proceed against them in convenient time.”
Stroud’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 284–85.
109 Stroud’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr.at 261.
110 Id. at 259.
111 Id.
112 See id. at 261. Littleton added: “[I]f it be truly treason, then they might have
returned treason, and then the party was not to be bailed of right, till there should be a
failure of prosecution.” Id.
113 Id. at 286.
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or published their Opinions therein, to inform his majesty thereof, and
humbly to advise him (as had been done by his noble progenitors in like
case) to send a direction to his Justices of his bench, to bail the
prisoners.”114

Unsurprisingly, “the king . . . was not pleased with their determination;
[and] commanded them not to deliver any opinion in this case without consulting with the rest of the judges; who delayed the business.”115 It was at this
point that the King removed all the prisoners not already there to the Tower,
communicating to King’s Bench that he had done so “because of their insolent carriage at the bar.”116 With no prisoners before them, there was little
King’s Bench could do:
[N]otwithstanding [the absence of the prisoners], it was prayed by the counsel for the prisoners, that the Court would deliver their Opinion as to the
matter in law: but the Court refused to do that, because it was to no purpose;
for the Prisoners being absent, they could not be bailed, delivered, or
remanded.117

In the end, although potentially prepared to change the course of
habeas law and restrict executive power, King’s Bench never announced its
opinion in the case.118 The prisoners remained in the Tower for the summer until Charles—perhaps eager to avoid his court finally wading into the
political thicket—offered the prisoners bail upon the giving of sureties for
good behavior. Led by Selden, who now argued his cause personally, the
prisoners refused, for they viewed the requirement of a surety as imputing
their guilt. Instead, Selden declared: “We demand to be bailed in point of
Right.”119 The King was unmoved. From this point, the prisoners’ stories
diverged: some were charged and convicted of sedition; two remained imprisoned until 1640; Selden languished for two more years in prison, and Eliot
famously suffered three severe years in the Tower, where he died and is
buried.120
Selden’s plight instructs that one should not view the Petition as having
dramatically altered the course of English law in any immediate fashion.121
114

Id. at 288 n.† (citing 1 BULSTRODE WHITELOCKE, MEMORIALS OF THE ENGLISH AFFAIRS
BEGINNING OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE FIRST TO THE HAPPY RESTORATION OF
KING CHARLES THE SECOND 14 (Oxford Univ. Press 1853) (1682)).
115 WHITELOCKE, supra note 114, at 14.
116 Id.
117 Stroud’s Case, 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 286.
118 Even this outcome was not clear until right before King’s Bench was set to
announce its opinion. The King originally promised to deliver Selden and Benjamin Valentine to the court, but he changed his mind “upon more mature deliberation,” deciding
that all prisoners should share the same plight and that none would be presented to the
court “until we have cause . . . to believe they will make a better demonstration of their
modesty and civility.” Id. at 287.
119 Id. at 289.
120 See Reeve, supra note 108, at 284–86.
121 Paul Halliday’s extensive review of writs filed during this period shows that it
remained common practice during this period for many subjects to be “imprisoned by
FROM THE

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL507.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 19

a “second magna carta”

29-AUG-16

16:02

1967

All the same, the Petition clearly influenced the thinking of leading contemporary jurists, introduced rights-based language to the English legal tradition, and set in motion important developments in English statutory law that
would come to pass over the next few decades.
III. BUILDING UP TO 1679: THE MOVEMENT TO RESTRICT THE ROYAL
COMMAND AS JUSTIFICATION FOR DETENTION THROUGH HABEAS
CORPUS LEGISLATION
It would take five decades before Parliament finally adopted a statute that
made real the aspirations of the Petition of Right and constrained the executive’s ability to detain outside the criminal process in the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679. Legislative efforts leading up to the 1679 Act go as far back as before
the Petition of Right, with Parliament having unsuccessfully attempted to
pass habeas legislation in 1621 and 1624. The year 1641, by contrast, finally
witnessed some progress. That year, by statute, Parliament “absolutely dissolved” the “Court commonly called the Star Chamber” and all the conciliar
courts for having acted beyond their authority and levying punishments not
warranted by law.122 Parliament invoked as authority for its legislation the
principles set forth in the Petition of Right and various statutes from the
reign of Edward III, including the famous provision tethered to the longstanding treason statute.123 Significantly, the 1641 law, known as the Star
Chamber Act, declared that any person imprisoned by the king, his Council
Board, or any member of the Privy Council had the right to challenge his
detention through a writ of habeas corpus before the Courts of King’s Bench
or Common Pleas.124 The Act called upon those judges to “examine and
determine whether the cause of . . . commitment appearing upon the . . .
return be just and legall.”125 Finally, to enforce its mandate that the jailor be
bound to make a return, the law provided that anyone acting “contrary to the
direction and true meaning” of the Act did so at the risk of suffering liability
to the prisoner for treble damages.126
The Star Chamber Act marked an important development by clearly subjecting executive detention to judicial review and setting forth statutorilybased procedures for certain habeas cases. It is no surprise that the law came
during a time when Parliament generally sought to claim for itself powers
previously claimed by the king.127 Indeed, during this period and well
means other than presentment or indictment, before 1627 and long after.” HALLIDAY,
supra note 9, at 139. All the same, the Petition was part of the story of Charles I’s downfall
(the king having resisted its terms) and England’s temporary conversion to a Commonwealth under the rule of Oliver Cromwell.
122 The Habeas Corpus Act 1641, 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (Eng.).
123 See id.
124 See id. § 6.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Many have commented on the egregious exercises of arbitrary power by the Star
Chamber, acting as an arm of the monarch. See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
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beyond, Parliament continued to claim—and exercise—the power to
imprison individuals at its pleasure completely free of judicial scrutiny
through attainder and impeachment proceedings.128
In the immediate wake of the Star Chamber Act, Charles attempted to
arrest six members of Parliament on charges of treason, thereby bringing the
power struggles between the monarch and the Houses to a head.129 The
English Civil War followed, ushering in the rule of Oliver Cromwell along
with a dramatic rise in the frequency of both executive and parliamentary
imprisonment of political enemies without process of any kind.130 During
this period, those in power also increasingly employed the practice of sending prisoners to “legal islands” (whether true islands or the Tower of
London) to escape the reach of writs of habeas corpus.131 While Parliament
toyed with adopting habeas legislation to regulate the practice,132 Cromwell
died and more war followed, ushering in the Restoration of the monarchy
under Charles II, son of Charles I. His reign would witness the greatest
advancements in statutory habeas law, and would at the same time lay the
groundwork for a period of extended unrest that would highlight its
limitations.
Several events in the 1660s reveal increased parliamentary attention to
the unsettled nature of both the reach and scope of protections inherent in
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 263 (1908) (calling the Star Chamber “a court of politicians enforcing a policy, not a court of judges administering the law”); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 169 (1960) (same). Another example of parliamentary assertions of power from this period may be found in Parliament’s decision in 1641 to decry the
leveling of Ship-Money and the judicial opinions that had upheld the King’s authority to
declare an emergency and take the property of subjects for the common defense. For
details, see D.L. Keir, The Case of Ship-Money, 52 L.Q. REV. 546 (1936).
128 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 226. Halliday tells the story of one noteworthy case in
1643, when the House of Lords arrested Sir Robert Berkeley “while presiding in King’s
Bench” and tried him only to conclude that he shall remain imprisoned “during the pleasure of this House.” Id. at 220 (quoting 6 HL JOUR. (1643) 214 (Eng.)) (citing W.J. JONES,
POLITICS AND THE BENCH: THE JUDGES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 137–43
(1971); CONRAD RUSSELL, PARLIAMENTS AND ENGLISH POLITICS, 1621–1629, at 103–14
(1979)); see G.V. Benson & J.M. Blatchly, Sir Francis Bacon, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/991?docPos=1;
Sheila Doyle, Sir Robert Berkeley, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, http://
www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2222?docPos=1; see also HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at
226–29 (detailing additional stories of parliamentary detention free of judicial review during the 1640s and 1650s).
129 For details, see Chafetz, supra note 98, at 1112–15.
130 See generally id.
131 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 229–31 (detailing several prominent cases).
132 The Interregnum did witness some notable progress in habeas law, for starting in
1649, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted several ordinances to make available the writ
of habeas corpus cum causa to poor prisoners jailed for “debt, breach of promise, contract or
covenant.” Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa—The Emergence of the Modern Writ—
II, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172, 175–76 (1940) (quoting 2 HENRY SCOBELL, ACTS AND ORDINANCES
OF PARLIAMENT 99 (London, H. Hills & J. Field 1658)). As Maxwell Cohen notes, the
return of the Stuarts led to the abrogation of this legislation. See id. at 178.
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the law of habeas corpus. In 1667, for example, the House of Commons
began impeachment proceedings against the Earl of Clarendon for his role
in sending prisoners to “remote islands, garrisons, and other places, thereby
to prevent them from the benefit of the law.”133 In the midst of a disagreement with the House of Lords over whether Clarendon should be imprisoned pending the proceedings, one member of the Commons (who was, no
less, a disciple of John Selden) felt no reservation about claiming that parliamentary-ordered detention in cases of suspected treason did not violate
Magna Carta because “Parliaments are confined to no rules or precedents,
where there is a concern of their own safety.”134 The statement is deeply
troubling from a civil liberties perspective to a reader conversant in the idea
of independent courts with settled rules of criminal procedure. This goes a
long way toward explaining why in time, Americans writing their Constitution, while providing for judicial independence, would react to the practice
by prohibiting legislative bills of attainder outright.135 But during this
period, Parliament’s claim to act independent of the supervision of the royal
courts must be viewed against the backdrop of decades of a parliamentary
struggle for privilege and protection from what it viewed as the “oppress[ive]
. . . power of the crown.”136
Indeed, to emphasize the tension between the royal courts and Parliament, in 1667, the Commons charged the Chief Justice of the Court of King’s
Bench, Sir John Kelyng, with employing “an arbitrary and illegal Power . . . of
dangerous Consequences to the Lives and Liberties of the People of England”
and “vilif[ying] . . . Magna Charta, the great Preserver of our Lives, Freedoms,
and Property.”137 One of the more specific complaints levied against the
Chief Justice focused on Kelyng’s action in a recent case in which he prevented “a Habeas Corpus and a Plures to be issued out, so that the party was
constrained to petition the King.”138 John Milward, a member of Parliament
133 Earl of Clarendon Case (1667) 6 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 317, 330–31 (Eng.) (continuing
to criticize Clarendon for doing so “to produce precedents for the imprisoning any other
of his majesty’s subjects in like manner”).
134 1 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 1694, at 53
(Anchitell Grey ed., London, D. Henry, R. Cave & J. Emonson 1763) [hereinafter GREY’S
DEBATES] (remarks of John Vaughan given Nov. 26, 1667); see also id. at 51 (“The discretion
of the Parliament ought to be unconfined.”) (remarks of Sir John Littleton given Nov. 25,
1667).
135 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
136 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *159 (“Privilege of parliament was principally established, in order to protect it’s [sic] members not only from being molested by their fellowsubjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by the power of the crown.”). For
more on this period, see generally JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
(2007).
137 9 HC JOUR. (1667) 35–36 (Eng.).
138 1 GREY’S DEBATES, supra note 134, at 63 (spelling the Chief Justice’s name “Keeling”). After the Chief Justice testified before the Commons, the House declined to proceed in the matter. See id. at 64.
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who kept a diary during this period, described the Chief Justice’s defense of
his denial of bail to the habeas petitioner as follows:
“[H]e answered that he did it in a time of danger, and the person whom it
was denied was a dangerous person and had formerly been in rebellion, and
although the Act of Oblivion had pardoned his former offences, yet he did
not think it safe to suffer a person of such ill principles to go at large in a
time so full of danger.”139

Milward was likely describing “Feimer’s Case,” reported in Sir Edward
Northey’s Notebooks as having presented King’s Bench with a petition for
habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner who had already spent five years in the
Tower based solely on a counciliar order. As Northey reports, King’s Bench
was no more welcoming to the petition than it had been to the petition in
the case of the Five Knights some forty years earlier. In ordering the prisoner
remanded, Northey’s Notebooks recount that Kelyng declared: “Likely he is a
dangerous person. We know not what times we live in. We must use a justifiable prudence and not strain the strict rules of law to enlarge those persons
which will use their liberties to get the kingdom in a flame.”140
In the immediate wake of these events, Parliament returned its attention
in 1668 to habeas corpus legislation directed at constraining the courts in
such cases. That year, Lord St. John introduced a bill “to prevent the denying habeas corpus.”141 Although the bill died with the proroguing (or
adjournment) of Parliament, it seems to have laid the groundwork for the
1679 Act insofar as “[i]t directed that no man should be kept in prison above
six months, but should be brought to his trial, and if then he was not legally
proceeded against within six months he should have his habeas corpus upon
the first moving for it.”142 An intervening round of habeas legislation in
1674 intended “to prevent imprisonment beyond [the] sea” and institute regular procedures for habeas proceedings.143 It too failed, but only after passing the Commons and introducing additional concepts that would eventually
make their way into the successful 1679 legislation.144
139 John Milward, Diary Entry (Dec. 13, 1667), in THE DIARY OF JOHN MILWARD, ESQ.
169 (Caroline Robbins ed., 1938) [hereinafter MILWARD’S DIARY]; see also Diary Entry (Dec.
11, 1667) in id. at 163; Diary Entry (Dec. 13, 1667) in id. at 166–70 (describing events
surrounding the Chief Justice’s testimony before the House). John Milward served in Parliament and kept a diary spanning the years 1666–1668. See id. at ix.
140 See Northey’s Notebook 226, in Hill Manuscripts at Lincoln’s Inn, London (Pascal
term, 19 Charles II, “Feimer’s Case”); Nutting, supra note 10, at 531 (quoting same).
141 John Milward, Diary Entry (Apr. 11, 1668), in MILWARD’S DIARY, supra note 139, at
253.
142 Diary Entry (Apr. 24, 1668) in id. at 278; see also Diary Entry (Apr. 11, 1668) in id. at
253; Diary Entry (May 7, 1668) in id. at 299.
143 HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 233.
144 See id. at 233–34. As historian Paul Halliday describes, the failure of the 1674–1675
bill likely stemmed from the distraction posed by an extraordinary series of contemporary
events that witnessed the Commons imprisoning a group of lawyers in the Tower, the
Lords sending writs of habeas corpus to the Tower on the lawyers’ behalf, and the Commons ordering the Tower jailor to ignore those writs. See id. at 234.
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Debates preceding the 1674 bill shed light on the problems that concerned Parliament during this period. As the title of that bill suggested, it
was directed in part at the practice of sending prisoners to places where writs
could not run.145 More fundamentally, however, the bill picked up right
where Selden and Coke had left off with the Petition of Right. Promoting
the legislation, Sir Thomas Clarges complained that there were “[m]ore warrants to the Tower under the king’s hand now, than in 200 years before.”146
Clarges posited that he “[w]ould have men committed to legal prisons” and
allow “a man [to] know his accuser” rather than continue the current state of
affairs, in which “the subject can have no remedy” for imprisonment by royal
command.147 Joining rank with Clarges, Colonel Birch also complained of
the common practice “to commit by the King’s or some great Minister’s warrant,” while positing that “it is not reasonable” in such cases that the king
“should be both Party and Judge.”148
Arguing against the legislation, Attorney General North saw “no need of
such a Law.”149 Secretary Coventry in turn invoked the security of the state
as reason to proceed with caution. “Suppose” he suggested, “[there is] war
here, and a correspondency; and suppose the King receives a letter, ‘that he
is betrayed by his Secretary,’ and he imprisons him; if he must have a deliverance, you can never have any intelligence.”150 When the debates resumed a
few days later, Coventry asked, if “the King’s warrant” will no longer suffice as
“cause,” what might his secretaries do “in case a man would kill the King”?151
In other words, Coventry suggested that limiting the king’s power to
imprison by expanding habeas corpus protections would undermine crucial
intelligence-gathering efforts and the ability to prevent attacks on the king
himself. Coventry’s arguments foreshadowed debates that later followed in
1696 in the wake of an assassination plot,152 and similar themes are found in
the broader debates that continue to this day on the role of the habeas privilege in wartime.153
The year 1677 witnessed a renewed effort by the Commons to enact a
habeas bill, but once again the Lords failed to pass it before the end of the
parliamentary session. Then—finally—circumstances favored the passage of
habeas legislation in 1679. Many commentators have cautioned against over145 During the debates, one reads many complaints about the practice of sending prisoners to Tangier and other places to escape judicial writs. See, e.g., 2 GREY’S DEBATES, supra
note 134, at 364–67.
146 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1673–74) col. 662.
147 2 GREY’S DEBATES, supra note 134, at 338; see id. (continuing: “the Ministers say, ‘it is
his Majesty’s Warrant;’ a thing very indecent, and unfit to be done!”).
148 Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 365.
150 Id. at 414.
151 Id. at 424.
152 See CLARENCE CORY CRAWFORD, THE SUSPENSION OF THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT IN
ENGLAND 51–52, 58 (1906).
153 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2009).
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emphasizing the role of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 in the story of the
privilege. English historian Henry Hallam, for one, wrote that the Act “introduced no new principle, nor conferred any right upon the subject.”154 It is
true that the Act worked together with the common law writ in many
respects. To begin, the Act harnessed the preexisting writ as a vehicle for
enforcing its terms.155 The common law writ, as Blackstone noted, also continued to serve as the vehicle for redress available in “all . . . cases of unjust
imprisonment” that were not covered by the Act.156 Likewise, it is also fair to
suggest that a fair number of the procedural aspects of the Act had already
been adopted by the courts. (Not unrelated is the fact that the King had
replaced Chief Justice Kelyng by this point with Sir Mathew Hale, a judge
who demonstrated a tendency to be far more progressive on this score.)157
As the next Part discusses, however, it would be wrong to view the Act as
having changed nothing.
IV. A “SECOND MAGNA CARTA”: THE ENGLISH HABEAS CORPUS ACT

OF

1679

Indeed, the Act accomplished two very important things. First, it
imposed substantial limitations on the scope of lawful detention by the executive. Second, because these constraints could only be disregarded by
English judges under threat of penalties prescribed in the Act, the Act also
dramatically curtailed judicial discretion. In so doing, the privilege associated with the Act came to hold a fixed status that its common law ancestor,
which permitted judges far greater discretion in deciding when to grant
relief to petitioners, had never known. These significant constraints—
unyielding as they were—quickly became apparent to Parliament, leading it
154 HALLAM, supra note 100, at 475. Hallam was not entirely consistent on this point.
See id. at 475–76 (observing that the Act “cut off the abuses by which the government’s lust
of power, . . . had impaired so fundamental a privilege”); see also 2 THOMAS BABINGTON
MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE SECOND 3 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1848) (describing the Act as “the most stringent curb that ever legislation imposed on tyranny”); Cohen, supra note 132, at 185, 195 (positing that “[f]ew, if
any, Acts of Parliament have achieved the fame of this Habeas Corpus Act of 1679” and
arguing that the Act improved habeas law). For his part, the English jurist Albert Venn
Dicey wrote that the British Habeas Corpus Acts “declare no principle and define no
rights, but they are for practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.” A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 195 (8th ed. 1915).
155 Chief Justice John Marshall later observed that the “statute . . . enforces the common law,” but, as discussed below, even this is not entirely right. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 193, 201–02 (1830).
156 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *137 (observing that “all other cases of unjust imprisonment” not covered by the Act were “left to the habeas corpus at common law”).
157 See Nutting, supra note 10, at 539. Earlier in the seventeenth century—specifically,
around the time of the Petition of Right—English judges began to employ the writ as a tool
for inquiring into both the cause of initial arrest and the cause of continued detention of
those who could claim to fall within the protection of domestic law. See HALLIDAY, supra
note 9, at 48–53.
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to invent the concept of suspension in order to displace the Act’s terms in
times of war.
It was, moreover, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 that gave the writ its
celebrated status in Blackstone’s famous Commentaries on the Laws of England,
published between 1765 and 1769 and widely read, particularly in the American colonies. Blackstone—building on Coke’s Institutes—linked the privilege
with the Great Charter’s guarantee that one may be detained only in accordance with due process.158 In Blackstone’s words, “Magna carta . . . declared,
that no man shall be imprisoned contrary to law: the habeas corpus act
points him out effectual means . . . to release himself.”159
Perhaps it is no accident, therefore, that the Act came to play a central
role in the development of American habeas corpus jurisprudence, given the
profound influence of Blackstone and Coke on American legal development
more generally and the timing of Blackstone’s publication specifically. Also
influential was Henry Care’s popular treatise on English Liberties, first published in London in the late seventeenth century and then reprinted and
widely circulated in the American colonies in the eighteenth century, which
called the Act a “most wholesome Law” and championed it as a cure for the
failings of the common law writ. As Care wrote:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus is a Remedy given by the Common Law, for
such as were unjustly detained in Custody, to procure their Liberty: But
before this Statute was rendered far less useful than it ought to be, partly by
the Judges, pretending a Power to grant or deny the said Writ at their Pleasure, in many Cases; and . . . [who] would oft-times alledge, That they could
not take Bail, because the Party was a Prisoner of State . . . .160
158 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *132–35; 2 INSTITUTES, supra note 54, at 54; see
also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (citing 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926) for the proposition that the writ of habeas corpus
gradually guaranteed Magna Carta’s promise); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 30 (New York, O. Halstead 1827) (writing of the Act that “[i]ts excellence consists in
the easy, prompt, and efficient remedy afforded for all unlawful imprisonment, and personal liberty is not left to rest for its security upon general and abstract declarations of
right”).
159 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *432. As is well known, the writings of Coke and
Blackstone represented the most influential sources on English law to which the Founding
generation turned in shaping American law. For example, Coke’s Institutes “were read in
the colonies by virtually everyone who undertook the study of law,” and Blackstone’s Commentaries “turned out to be even more influential on American law and lawyers in the formative decades than Coke’s Institutes.” MEADOR, supra note 53, at 23, 28; see also Amanda L.
Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 614–22 (2009) (surveying sources
on this point).
160 HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE 185
(W.N. ed., 5th ed., Bos., J. Franklin 1721); see also CHARLES JAMES FOX, HISTORY OF THE
EARLY PART OF THE REIGN OF JAMES THE SECOND 24–25 (Phila., Abraham Small 1808)
(“[T]he Habeas Corpus Act [is] the most important barrier against tyranny, and best
framed protection for the liberty of individuals, that has ever existed in any ancient or
modern commonwealth.”).
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In the period leading up to and encompassing the Revolutionary War,
moreover, Americans came to appreciate all too well the importance of the
Act as central to the story of habeas corpus. The American colonists decried
the crown’s refusal to grant them the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act
in the American colonies; those Americans unlucky enough to be captured
and brought to English soil during the war, moreover, were subject to a suspension of the Act’s protections.161
Before exploring the Act’s terms, we must first tackle the longstanding
question whether Parliament actually passed the law in the first place. Contemporary lore had it that at the time of a crucial vote in the House of Lords,
one of the tellers, Lord Grey, was set to count the Lords favoring the bill as
they passed through a doorway to reenter the House.162 The story goes that
Grey decided to test the other teller’s attentiveness by counting one generously-sized Lord as ten and then when the joke went unnoticed, he recorded
the number, thereby securing the requisite votes in favor of the bill.163 In
support of the story, one writer points to inconsistencies between the vote
numbers and the reported attendance in the Lords’ Chamber that day.164
It is a great story, but as Professor Helen Nutting once observed, it is also
“highly improbable.”165 After all, James II was soon to take the throne and
designate the Habeas Corpus Act as one of two laws that he wished to see
repealed—surely he would “have taken advantage of a real miscount to overturn the act.”166 In addition, the attendance lists of the period were “notoriously inaccurate,”167 the Lords had passed earlier versions of the bill without
incident, and the Lords had the final say on the terms of the bill as it
emerged from the Conference with the House.168
This being said, the statute came during a period of great unrest in
English history. Many in Parliament were highly critical of Charles II’s
repeated proroguing of the Houses to render impossible the passage of legislation with which he did not agree.169 After speaking against the practice,
Francis Jenks found himself sent to the Gatehouse by the Privy Council.170
161 See generally Tyler, supra note 29, at 647.
162 See J.E. POWELL, GREAT PARLIAMENTARY OCCASIONS 63–65 (Queen Anne Press, 1960).
Powell relies on the account of the events given by Gilbert Burnet in his History of His Own
Times, written shortly after passage of the Act. See id. at 65.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Nutting, supra note 10, at 527 n.1.
166 Id.
167 Id.; see also Godfrey Davies & Edith L. Klotz, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 in the
House of Lords, 3 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 469, 469–70 (1940) (highlighting numerous mistakes in the attendance lists for the House of Lords on the relevant date of the vote).
168 See 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1679) cols. 1148–49 (recording the evolution of the bill to
final form). The Lords passed an earlier version of the bill on May 2, prior to the storied
vote of May 27. See 13 HL JOUR. (1679) 549 (Eng.).
169 See Earl of Shaftsbury Case, 6 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1269, 1297–98 (Eng.).
170 See J.L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH
GOVERNMENT 362 (London, T. Spilsbury 1775).
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When, in turn, the Earl of Shaftsbury defended Jenks and argued that proroguing Parliament for longer than a year was unlawful, the Lords sent him
to the Tower of London. He languished in the Tower for a year before
finally agreeing to apologize to the King and Lords.171 Shaftsbury’s failure to
secure relief in the courts for his own detention highlights the reality of the
period that control over the law of detention was much more about power
than individual liberty. Specifically, when Shaftsbury sought relief in the
form of a writ of habeas corpus from King’s Bench, the Justices declared that
the House of Lords was superior to them and therefore its orders were not
subject to review before their court.172
Meanwhile, the question whether James—Duke of York, brother of
Charles II, and a Catholic convert—would succeed to the throne on
Charles’s death controlled most political affairs. Concerns over his ascendency had already fueled legislation barring Catholics from membership in
the Houses of Parliament and generating witch-hunts for supporters of the
so-called “Popish Plot,” which allegedly sought to usher in Catholic rule by
speeding Charles II’s demise.173 One finds interspersed with the Commons’
debates over the habeas bill the introduction of bills to discover and convict
“Popish Recusants”174 along with votes in favor of declaring the Duke of York
a “Papist” who “has given the greatest Countenance and Encouragement to
the present Conspiracies and Designs of the Papists against the King.”175
Likewise one finds records of the ongoing impeachment trials of the “Five
Popish Lords” who had been ordered to the Tower of London by the very
same Earl of Shaftesbury after being deemed guilty by the House of treason
against the state.176 Professor Nutting’s work aptly highlights the irony that
the Habeas Corpus Act came at a time “when men seemingly were more
interested in getting their fellow Englishmen into jail than out of it.”177
Who drafted the bill remains the subject of some dispute. According to
some historians, it may have been Attorney General Sir William Jones.178
171 See Earl of Shaftsbury Case, 6 Cobbett’s St. Tr. at 1298–1302. For extensive details on
Shaftsbury’s case, see id. at 1269–310. Shaftsbury was one of three House members sent to
the Tower by the Lords. Upon learning of their fate, the Earl of Salisbury and Shaftsbury
both requested that they be permitted to bring their cooks, “which the king resented
highly, as carrying in it an insinuation of the worst sort.” Id. at 1272 n.†. Shaftsbury apologized by calling his earlier remarks “ill-advised” and “humbly beg[ged] the pardon” of the
King and the House of Lords. Id. at 1298.
172 See id. at 1272 n.†.
173 See generally JOHN POLLOCK, THE POPISH PLOT: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN
OF CHARLES II (London, Duckworth & Co. 1903).
174 9 HC JOUR. (1647) 618 (Eng.).
175 Id. at 616.
176 See Five Popish Lords Case (1678) 7 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1217, 1218–576 (Eng.); see also
9 HC JOUR. (1647) 584, 617 (Eng.) (ordering a committee to inspect the journals of the
House of Lords covering the proceedings regarding the impeached Lords).
177 Nutting, supra note 10, at 527.
178 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 238–39; Nutting, supra note 10, at 540. Relying on the
Lords’ committee book, Nutting identifies Lord North as having promoted most of the
Lords’ amendments to the bill. See id.
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Many helped move the bill along the Commons, including Sir Thomas
Clarges who had previously promoted the 1674 bill. Shaftsbury, an exclusionist who openly sought to block the Duke of York from inheriting the
throne, is often credited with having shepherded the bill through the Lords.
In so doing, he had help from various colleagues, including Baron Holles,
who years earlier had secured passage of the Star Chamber Act in 1641.179
Once introduced, the bill quickly moved through the Commons but stalled
in the face of numerous amendments at the hands of the Lords, which created the need for more than one conference between the chambers to settle
terms. The bill passed when the Commons accepted most of the Lords’
amendments, probably spurred on by the fact that the King was on his way to
the House of Lords to give his assent to all outstanding bills, including the
Habeas Corpus Act, before calling the parliamentary session to an end.180
Given that the legislation was written to curtail royal powers and promoted by those who would curtail his line, it is curious that Charles II gave
his assent to the Act at all. English Whig historian Thomas Macaulay wrote
that although the King did not favor the legislation, “he was about to appeal
from his Parliament to his people on the question of the succession, and he
could not venture, at so critical a moment, to reject a bill which was in the
highest degree popular.”181 Others have suggested that the King’s assent
came in part because many of the Act’s terms were no longer controversial in
light of evolving judicial practices and that by assenting to the law, the King
hoped to secure leniency from Parliament in its treatment of his close adviser
Lord Danby, whom Parliament had recently sent to the Tower.182
The Houses entitled the legislation “An Act for the better securing the
Liberty of the Subject, and for preventing of Imprisonments beyond the
Seas” and declared that it was intended to address “great delays” by jailers “in
making Returns to Writts of Habeas Corpus to them directed” as well as other
abuses undertaken “to avoid . . . yielding Obedience to such Writts.”183 By its
terms, the Act sought to remedy the fact that “many of the Kings Subjects
have beene and hereafter may be long detained in Prison, in such Cases
where by Law they are baylable.” Toward that end, the Act declared that it
was “[f]or the prevention whereof and the more speedy Releife of all persons
imprisoned for any such criminall or supposed criminall Matters.”184 In
defining its scope as such, the Act did not speak to cases of civil detention,
but limited its reach to those cases involving “all persons imprisoned for any such
criminall or supposed criminall Matters”—a category that very soon would come
179 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 239. As Halliday notes, Holles had been imprisoned
by the Privy Council earlier in his life. See id. (citing K.H.D. HALEY, THE FIRST EARL OF
SHAFTESBURY 359–60 (1968)).
180 13 HL JOUR. (1679) 595 (Eng.).
181 1 MACAULAY, supra note 154, at 232.
182 See, e.g., Nutting, supra note 10, at 542.
183 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 310 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
184 Id.
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to be understood as embracing not just ordinary criminals, but domestic enemies of the state as well.185
In an attempt to codify regular procedures for such cases, section two of
the Act set forth how courts and jailers should respond upon the filing of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The law provided that the jailer “shall
within Three dayes after the Service” of a writ “make Returne of such Writt”
and bring “the Body of the Partie soe committed or restrained” before the
relevant court while “certify[ing] the true causes of his Detainer or Imprisonment.”186 Section three of the Act set forth procedures for obtaining writs
during the vacation periods of the courts,187 a response to recent events,
including the Francis Jenkes case in 1676, in which vacation writs had been
denied even where bail likely should have been granted.188 Section five of
the Act, building on the model established in the Star Chamber Act, set forth
escalating penalties to be paid to the prisoner, in cases where jailers violated
the obligation to make a return and produce the prisoner.189 Sections six
and nine curtailed the common abuses of re-committing discharged prisoners for the same offense and moving prisoners around to escape a court’s
jurisdiction.190 Section eleven clarified that the writ would run to various
islands and “privileged Places” within the Kingdom notwithstanding the judicial precedents that had previously deemed these places the equivalent of
legal islands.191 To reach yet further abusive practices by the king and his
ministers, section twelve declared that the imprisonment of any “Subject of
this Realme” in Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, Tangier (a common destination for prisoners condemned by the Earl of Clarendon), or “Parts Garrisons Islands or Places beyond the Seas . . . within or without the Dominions
of His Majestie,” is “hereby enacted and adjudged to be illegal.”192
Many of these provisions are most significant for providing a measure of
certainty as to habeas procedures and also the availability of the writ—
whether in vacation term or from privileged places, for example.193 But the
185 Id. (emphasis added). Section 8 of the Act specifically disclaimed coverage of civil
causes. See id. § 8.
186 Id. § 2.
187 Id. § 3.
188 Jenkes Case (1676) 6 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1189, 1190, 1196, 1207 (Eng.). The Council
had committed Jenkes for contempt but the Chief Justice of King’s Bench and the Lord
Chancellor both refused to grant his writ because it came during vacation. For a full
description of the case against Jenkes, see id. at 1190–1208.
189 See Habeas Corpus Act 1679 § 5.
190 See id. §§ 6, 9.
191 Id. § 11.
192 Id. § 12. Section four provided that one who failed to petition for habeas corpus for
two terms could not obtain habeas corpus during vacation time. See id. § 4.
193 Paul Halliday’s work shows that vacation writs were sometimes issued before the Act,
see HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 55–56, but practice was far from uniform and such writs were
denied in several high profile cases in the decade leading up to enactment of the English
Act (including the Jenkes case, discussed earlier), see id. at 236–37, 239. Halliday’s work
documents a similar story with respect to the Privy Council’s practice of sending prisoners
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seventh section of the Act did much more than this. That section both connected the writ of habeas corpus with the criminal process and placed specific limits on how and when the executive lawfully could detain the most
serious of criminals—even alleged traitors. By its terms, the section covered
“any person or persons . . . committed for High Treason or Fellony.”194
Where a prisoner committed on this basis was not indicted within two court
terms (a period typically spanning only three-to-six months), the Act provided that the justices of King’s Bench and other criminal courts “are hereby
required . . . to sett at Liberty the Prisoner upon Baile.”195 Going further,
section seven also declared that “if any person or persons committed as aforesaid . . . shall not be indicted and tryed the second Terme . . . or upon his
Tryall shall be acquitted he shall be discharged from his Imprisonment.”196 In
other words, the Act promised the most dangerous of suspects the remedy of
discharge where they were not timely tried and convicted. Referring to this
section, Chief Justice John Holt would write fifteen years after its passage that
“the design of the Act was to prevent a man’s lying under accusation of treason, &c. above two terms.”197
Going back to the reign of Edward III, high treason had long included,
among other things, plotting the demise of the king or his line, levying war
against the king, and adhering or providing aid to the king’s enemies.198 As
Blackstone elaborated in his Commentaries, treason encompassed a whole
range of acts that today we would view as taking up arms against the government or the equivalent of terrorism.199 It followed that high treason not only
encompassed aiding “foreign powers with whom we are at open war,” but also
to legal islands, detailing one case in which the passage of the Act made all the difference.
See id. at 240; see also id. at 231 (detailing additional cases).
194 Habeas Corpus Act 1679 § 7.
195 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Id. (emphasis added). These judicial mandates came under threat of financial penalty. See id. § 10. Note that over time the relevant language from section 7 moved to section 6 of the Act. Nevertheless, all references here reflect the section’s original placement.
Judges initially often evaded the Act’s protections by setting excessive bail; for that reason,
the Declaration of Rights in 1689 outlawed the practice. See Declaration of Rights 1689, 1
W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.).
197 Crosby’s Case (1694) 88 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1168; see also Ex parte Beeching (1825) 107
Eng. Rep. 1010, 1010 (Abbott, C.J.) (“The object of the Habeas Corpus Act was to provide
against delays in bringing persons to trial, who were committed for criminal matters.” (citations omitted)). Note that “[t]hose charged with misdemeanours were not protected [by
this section], probably because they were considered to have a right to be bailed pending
trial.” JUDITH FARBEY & R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 160 (3d ed. 2011).
198 See The Treason Act 1351, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2 (Eng.) (establishing the law of high
treason); see also Clarence C. Crawford, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, 42 AM. L. REV. 481, 490
n.30 (1908) (“Edw. III., St. 5, C. 2 . . . laid the basis for the law of high treason for five
hundred years.”). “[A]ttempt[s] w[ere] made to fill in the more important gaps” in the
original treason statute “by additional legislation and by judicial interpretation,” both of
which “led to much abuse.” Id. In such cases, Parliament often redefined the crime of
high treason itself. Id.
199 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *83.
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providing assistance to “foreign pirates or robbers, who may happen to
invade our coasts, without any open hostilities between their nation and our
own”200—that is, aiding non-state actors hostile to the monarch. Blackstone
also instructed that high treason “most indisputably” included adhering to or
aiding “fellow-subjects in actual rebellion at home.”201 The common aspects
of treason included “giving [the enemy] intelligence, . . . sending them provisions, . . . selling them arms, . . . treacherously surrendering a fortress, or the
like.”202 Each of these acts was most likely to occur in time of war, yet the
Habeas Corpus Act did not include any exception for wartime. For this very
reason, Charles II’s successor, his brother James, viewed the Act as “a great
misfortune,” lamenting that “it oblige[d] the Crown to keep a greater force
on foot th[an] it needed otherwise to preserve the government” and deal
with the “disaffected, turbulent, and unquiet spirits” and “their wicked
designs.”203
It was because the crime of high treason was so serious—it was generally
a capital offense with no opportunity for bail—that Blackstone counseled
that its sanctions must be safeguarded from abuse by the government.204
Thus, Blackstone wrote that high treason must be “the most precisely ascertained” of crimes, for if it “be indeterminate, this alone . . . is sufficient to
make any government degenerate into arbitrary power.”205 He likewise cautioned that the “opportunity to create abundance of constructive treasons”
was equally dangerous to liberty.206 Chief Justice Mathew Hale also cautioned against deviating from the settled legal framework for punishing
treason:
How dangerous it is by construction and analogy to make treasons, where
the letter of the law has not done it: for such a method admits of no limits or
bounds, but runs as far as the wit and invention of accusers, and the odiousness and detestation of persons accused will carry men.207
200 Id.
201 Id. Misprision of treason was also a serious crime during this period. It encompassed, among other things, concealing knowledge of treasonous plots (something
thought to constitute aiding and abetting). See id. at *120. For more on the crime of high
treason during the pre-ratification period, see MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE
COUNTY OF SURRY AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES 183–251 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809).
202 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *82.
203 ANDREW AMOS, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION IN THE REIGN OF KING CHARLES THE SECOND 203 (London, V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 1857) (quoting James II, For My Son, the
Prince of Wales, in 2 THE LIFE OF JAMES THE SECOND 621 (J.S. Clarke ed., London, Longman,
Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown 1816) (1692)).
204 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *92.
205 Id. at *75.
206 See also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1791, at 667–68 (Cambridge, Mass., Brown, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (discussing the
dangers of multiplying types of treason).
207 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE [THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN] 86–87 (London, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736).
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Recognizing the importance of safeguards in treason cases, Parliament
enacted the Treason Act in 1696. Following on the heels of the Habeas
Corpus Act, the legislation instituted additional protections for those
charged with the crime of high treason.208 These included the requirement
of two witnesses to an overt act,209 a requirement later imported into the
United States Constitution’s Treason Clause,210 and other protections that
had not been previously granted to those accused of common law crimes,
including the rights to counsel and to compel witnesses for one’s defense.211
In so doing, the Act marked a major step in inaugurating a revolution in
criminal procedure.
Viewing all of these developments together, it was no stretch for Henry
Care’s popular treatise on English law to point to Magna Carta, the Habeas
Corpus Act, and the 1696 treason statute as the great protectors of English
liberties.212 It is also true, however, that much of this legal framework was
the product not so much of a deep concern for civil liberties per se, but represented instead the product of a concerted effort by Parliament to protect its
privileges and wrestle control of such matters from the monarch.213
* * *
Thus, at long last Selden and Coke’s aspiration to constrain the executive’s power to detain outside the criminal process finally came to be. No
longer did the king and his ministers enjoy free reign to detain without proceeding toward criminal trial, nor did the royal courts enjoy any longer discretion to disregard these same limitations on executive detention when
ruling on habeas corpus petitions. Instead, by the terms of the Habeas
Corpus Act, Parliament claimed for itself control over the relevant legal
framework for the detention of prisoners. The constraints imposed by that
Act, while ultimately central to the story of individual liberty in the American
constitutional tradition, must be viewed at its origins as part of the rise of
parliamentary supremacy, including Parliament’s assertion of much greater
control over matters of war and foreign affairs during this period.214 No
longer would the royal command suffice as justification for operating outside
208 See The Treason Act 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.).
209 See id. § 2 (“[N]oe Person or Persons whatsoever shall bee indicted tryed or
attainted of High Treason . . . [without] the Oaths and Testimony of Two lawfull Witnesses
either both of them to the same Overtact or one of them to one and another of them to
another Overtact. . . .”).
210 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
211 See 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3; see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 67–105 (A.W. Brian Simpson ed., 2003) (detailing background of the Act and
observing that it launched a revolution in criminal procedure).
212 See CARE, supra note 160, at 185.
213 As Hayek has written, “[i]ndividual liberty in modern times can hardly be traced
back farther than the England of the seventeenth century. It appeared first, as it probably
always does, as a by-product of a struggle for power rather than as the result of deliberate
aim.” HAYEK, supra note 127, at 162 (footnote omitted).
214 On this development, see generally Turner, supra note 40.
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the constraints of parliamentary law. In time, Scotland and Ireland adopted
the same habeas protections in their own acts—Scotland in 1701 and Ireland
in 1782215—while attempts to invoke the protections of the Habeas Corpus
Act by the American colonists were repeatedly frustrated by the crown.216
For American colonists studying English law during this period, the
inability to claim the benefits of the Habeas Corpus Act and related legal
protections such as trial by jury and the various protections of the Trial of
Treasons Act—all of which the crown denied them—would foster a deep
resentment of English rule. Indeed, in the period leading up to the Revolutionary War, these same Americans were steeped in Henry Care’s treatise on
English Liberties and Blackstone’s recently published Commentaries, which
labeled the Habeas Corpus Act a “second magna carta”217 and celebrated its
promise that “no man is to be arrested, unless charged with such a crime, as
will at least justify holding him to bail, when taken.”218 Blackstone also
rejected general warrants “to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or particularly describing any person in special” as “illegal and void.”219
Whether so-called Whig History or not, Care and Blackstone’s work dominated the popular and political discourse surrounding habeas corpus with
the effect of making the Habeas Corpus Act the central component of the
story.
But the American experience did not know many of the rights and protections about which Care and Blackstone wrote. In the period leading up to
the Revolutionary War, American colonists suffered the increasing issuance
of general search warrants (called writs of assistance) and, James Otis’s eloquent protests notwithstanding, were repeatedly told by the crown that they
did not enjoy the same rights as their English counterparts across the Atlan215 See The Criminal Procedure Act 1701, 12 Will. 3, c. 6 (Scot.) (declaring that “the
imprisonment of persons without expressing the reasons and delaying to put them to trial
is contrary to law”); Habeas Corpus Act 1781, 21 & 22 Geo. 3, c. 11, § XVI (Ir.) (importing
much of the language of the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act verbatim, with this notable addition:
a provision allowing the Irish Council to suspend the act “during such time only as there
shall be an actual invasion or rebellion in this kingdom or Great Britain”).
216 See Tyler, supra note 29, at 645–48 (providing details); see also TYLER, supra note 23
(same).
217 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *133.
218 4 id. at *286; see also 1 id. at *133 (“[I]t is unreasonable to send a prisoner [to jail],
and not to signify withal the crimes alleged against him.”). Here, Blackstone was paraphrasing Acts 25:27, in which a Roman magistrate explained to St. Paul: “[I]t seemeth to
me unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not withal to signify the crimes laid against him.”
Acts 25:27 (King James). Coke also drew on this passage in his speeches. 2 Parl. Hist. Eng.
(1628) cols. 266–71, reprinted in 3 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD
COKE 1243–50 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (speech given by Coke on April 3, 1628, in
Conference with the Lords); see also HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 1 (noting same).
219 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *288; see also EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176 (6th ed. London, W. Rawlins 1681) (1644)
(stating that justices of the peace could not issue warrants to arrest on suspicion alone); 2
THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 252 (Bos., Crosby &
Nichols 1864) (writing that “[t]he illegality of general warrants” was settled by this time).
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tic. There, Blackstone instructed, the Habeas Corpus Act had made “the
remedy . . . now complete for removing the injury of unjust and illegal confinement,” and being “apprehended upon suspicion” alone was no longer
legal anywhere the Act remained in force.220 It would take a revolution for
these principles to take hold in America.
V.

AN IMPERFECT SAFEGUARD

Even where the Act did apply, its limitations quickly came to light. For
example, following its passage, the practice of moving prisoners to so-called
“legal islands” (even those specifically mentioned in the Act) continued. In
1683, when the government learned of the so-called Rye House Plot to murder Charles II and his brother James, then the Duke of York, it arrested a
number of alleged conspirators, including twelve Scotsmen.221 Despite the
fact that these prisoners had been arrested in England on suspicion of treason committed there, the Scots Privy Council, presided over by the King himself, ordered the prisoners dispatched to Scotland.222 Upon arrival, some
were tried, but several others were never tried and instead tortured repeatedly for intelligence.223 The decision to deport the prisoners appears to
have been driven entirely by the absence of the governance of the Habeas
Corpus Act in Scotland at that time and therefore highlights the geographic
limitations of the Act that would become increasingly important in the next
century.224
It is also the case that during this period the exceptions to the Act’s
coverage—even where it applied—proved substantial. Consider the story of
Charles II’s illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, who had been exiled
from England in 1683 in the wake of the failed Rye House Plot, in which he
had played a role. In the immediate wake of the death of the King and
Charles’s brother’s crowning as James II two years later, Monmouth returned
to England determined to foster rebellion and wrestle the throne from his
uncle. After Monmouth was defeated in battle and captured, James ordered
him sent to the Tower of London. Monmouth never enjoyed a criminal trial,
but instead within days of his capture, Parliament passed a bill of attainder in
which it found him summarily guilty of treason and ordered his execution.225
220 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *137–38 (emphasis added).
221 See W.B. Gray, The Scottish Deportees of 1683 and the Habeas Corpus Act, 35 JURID. REV.
353, 354–55 (1923).
222 See id. at 355–56.
223 See id. at 357–58.
224 See id. at 360. For more on the geographic limitations of the Habeas Corpus Act
during the American Revolutionary War, see generally Tyler, supra note 29.
225 See An Act to Attaint James Duke of Monmouth of High Treason 1685, 1 Jac. II, c. 2
(Eng.) (“Whereas James Duke of Monmouth has in an hostile Manner Invaded this
Kingdome and is now in open Rebellion Levying Warr against the King contrary to the
Duty of his Allegiance, Bee it enacted . . . That the said James Duke of Monmouth Stand
and be Convicted and Attainted of High-Treason and that he suffer Paines of Death and
Incurr all Forfeitures as a Traitor Convicted and Attainted of High Treason.”).
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His gruesome public beheading on Tower Hill followed in due course, and
scores of his followers were executed or sold into slavery without trial. Parliament would continue to wield its potent and essentially unchecked attainder
power for some time to come.226
With the flight of James II from the throne only a handful of years later
and in response to attempts by those loyal to him to retake the throne for his
line, Parliament would create yet another means of side-stepping the mandates of the Habeas Corpus Act. Ironically, in so doing, Parliament would
both confirm and underscore the potency of Act’s protections where they
could not be so evaded.
* * *
Indeed, it is because the Habeas Corpus Act did not include any exception for wartime that Parliament soon created the concept of suspension,
which became inextricably intertwined with the Act and its seventh section.
The first suspension came just ten years after adoption of the Habeas Corpus
Act in the immediate wake of the Glorious Revolution. While fighting to
retain control of the throne that he had just assumed, William asked Parliament in 1689 to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act in order to counter the
Jacobite supporters of the dethroned James Stuart who sought to return his
line to power.227 In response to the many threats posed by the Jacobites,
William presented Parliament with a request that it suspend the seventh section of the Habeas Corpus Act for the express purpose of authorizing him to
arrest solely on suspicion––that is, without formal charges––of treasonous
activity. His emissary, Richard Hampden, conveyed the request to Parliament
by stating that the Crown sought the power to confine persons “committed
on suspicion of Treason only,” lest they be “deliver[ed] . . . by Habeas
Corpus.”228 As Paul Halliday has noted, it is remarkable that Hampden delivered the King’s message and it shows just “how much political circumstances
226 One year after the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act, a member of Parliament
explained this exception this way:
I have perused the Habeas Corpus bill, and do find, that there is not any thing in
it that doth reach, or can be intended to reach to any commitment made by
either house of parliament during session. The preamble of the Act, and all the
parts of it, do confine the extent of the Act to cases bailable, and directs such
courses for the execution of the act, as cannot be understood should relate to any
commitment made by either house. This house is a court of itself, and part of the
highest court in the nation, superior to those in Westminster-hall . . . .
4 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1679) cols. 1263–64 (remarks of Sir William Jones) (addressing a
motion to admit bail). Indeed, by this time, it was fairly well-settled that the courts could
not review orders of the houses of Parliament. See CHAFETZ, supra note 137, at 28, 32–34.
The common defense for parliamentary independence of the royal courts predicated the
need for such independence on the Commons being “intrusted with the liberty of the
people.” Id. at 34 (quoting R. v. Paty (1704) 92 Eng. Rep. 232, 233).
227 For discussion of this suspension and its extensions, see Tyler, supra note 31, at
934–51.
228 9 GREY’S DEBATES, supra note 134, at 129–30 (remarks of Richard Hampden).
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had changed” in the prior decade, for Hampden had been “an active supporter” of the Habeas Corpus Act.229 Even more remarkable about
Hampden’s efforts to expand executive power to detain is the fact that he was
the great-nephew of one of the Five Knights imprisoned for failing to pay the
King’s forced loans some sixty years earlier, Sir Edmund Hampden.230
In the decades of wartime and instability that followed removal of the
Stuart line from the throne, Parliament enacted several more suspensions to
address ongoing war with France and the Jacobite revolts. All of these suspensions by their terms empowered the Crown to arrest those believed to
pose a danger to the state on suspicion alone.231 In each case, Parliament
suspended the Act’s protections in order to free the executive from having to
comply with its stringent requirements and in so doing expand the executive’s authority to arrest and detain in the name of national security.232 Suspension was not viewed, however, as a necessary predicate to hold persons
classified as prisoners of war, who by definition were treated as falling outside
the protection of domestic English law and who instead looked to the Law of
Nations for protection. (As Hale explained, for this reason, such persons
could not claim the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act.233) This very
same model governed the important suspension legislation that Parliament
adopted during the American Revolutionary War, which it allowed to lapse
once independence became a foregone conclusion and it declared American
prisoners in England at that point to be prisoners of war.234 In time, the
same model would be imported into early American habeas jurisprudence.
229 HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 247.
230 See JOHN PHILIPOT, THE VISITATION OF THE COUNTY OF BUCKINGHAM MADE IN 1634,
70–71 (W. Harry Rylands ed., 1909) (presenting a genealogical tree of the Hampdens of
Buckinghamshire); THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1604–1629
(Andrew Thrush & John P. Ferris eds., 2010) (entry on John Hampden) http://
www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1604-1629/member/hampden-john-15951643; THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1660–1690 (B.D. Henning
ed., 1983) (entry on Richard Hampden), http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/vol
ume/1660-1690/member/hampden-richard-1631-95.
231 For details on the English suspensions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
see Tyler, supra note 31, at 934–51; see also TYLER, supra note 23.
232 See Tyler, supra note 31, at 934–38 (discussing how these suspensions expanded
executive power).
233 See 1 HALE, supra note 207, at 159 (“[T]hose that raise war against the king may be
of two kinds, subjects or foreigners, the former are not properly enemies but rebels or
traitors . . . .”). For greater discussion of how this distinction applied during the Jacobite
wars, see HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 170–73.
234 For details on this period and suspension, see generally Tyler, supra note 29, and
Tyler, supra note 31, at 969–75. As I explored in this earlier work, once Parliament recognized that American prisoners held in England during the Revolutionary War were soldiers
fighting for a newly independent and foreign sovereign, it allowed the suspension legalizing their detention to lapse and declared them to be prisoners of war whose relationship
with England would be governed by the Law of Nations. See Tyler, supra note 29, at 691–93
(citing An Act for the Better Detaining, and More Easy Exchange, of American Prisoners
Brought into Great Britain 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 10 (Gr. Brit.)).
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From the beginning of English settlement in America, the colonists
claimed to possess “all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of England.”235 But as I have detailed in
other work, this claim rarely equated with the reality on the ground. Despite
attempts on the part of several colonies to adopt or invoke the protections of
the Habeas Corpus Act as their own, the king and his ministers consistently
denied colonists outside England the “privilege” of the benefits of the Act.
To give one prominent example, in 1684, New York submitted its Charter of
Liberties and Privileges to the Committee of Trade and Plantations (part of
the Privy Council) for approval, having secured the approval of the thenDuke of York. In the charter, the New York colonists claimed the general
right to “be governed by and according to the Laws of England.”236 Within a
month of inheriting the throne from his brother, the Duke of York––now
crowned James II––vetoed the charter on the stated basis that “[t]his
Priviledge is not granted to any of His Mats Plantations where the Act of
Habeas Corpus and all such other Bills do not take Place.”237 Similarly, in
1692, the Massachusetts colony attempted to pass a Habeas Corpus Act that
essentially copied the 1679 English Act. The Privy Council disallowed this
attempt as well, decreeing in 1695:
[W]hereas . . . the writt of Habeas Corpus is required to be granted in like
manner as is appointed by the Statute 31, Car. II. in England, which
priviledge has not as yet been granted in any of His Matys Plantations, It was
not thought fitt in His Majtys absence that the said Act should be continued
in force and therefore the same hath been repealed.238

To the extent that any doubt remained on this score, Massachusetts’s colonial governor declared in 1699 that the “Habeas corpus act [is] not to be in
force in the colonies.”239 Other colonies experienced similar rebukes from
the crown on this score.240
235 Sullivan’s Draught (Oct. 14, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774–1789, at 63, 68 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904), [hereinafter JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].
236 Observations upon the Charter of the Province of New-York (Mar. 3, 1685), in 3
DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 357 (John
Romeyn Brodhead ed., Albany, N.Y., Weed, Parsons & Co. 1853).
237 Id. For details, see David S. Lovejoy, Equality and Empire: The New York Charter of
Libertyes, 1683, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 493, 510–14 (1964) (detailing story).
238 An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for Prevention of
Illegal Imprisonment, ch. 42 (1692), in 1 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF
THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 95, 99 (Bos., Wright & Potter 1869) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from the Privy Council).
239 PAUL M. HAMLIN & CHARLES E. BAKER, SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK 1691–1704, at 389 (1952) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
240 See TYLER, supra note 23, at 645–48 (providing details).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL507.txt

1986

unknown

Seq: 38

notre dame law review

29-AUG-16

16:02

[vol. 91:5

Over time, the denial of the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act to the
colonists became a major source of complaint regarding British rule. In
1774, for example, the Continental Congress documented a number of grievances regarding British rule in a letter to the people of Great Britain. The
Congress decried the fact that colonists were “the subjects of an arbitrary
government, deprived of trial by jury, and when imprisoned cannot claim the
benefit of the habeas corpus Act, that great bulwark and palladium of English
liberty.”241 It is therefore hardly surprising to find that in constructing their
own independent legal frameworks in the immediate wake of the Declaration
of Independence, the early states were quick to import the privilege that they
associated with the English Habeas Corpus Act and adopt it as their own.
During the Revolutionary War, moreover, at least six states enacted suspension legislation modeled on British practice for the express purpose of legalizing detention of persons suspected of aiding the British outside the
criminal process.242 Putting all of this together, there is extensive evidence
surrounding the development of American law during the colonial and early
period of American independence suggesting that the influence of the
English Habeas Corpus Act on early American law was both profound and
widespread.
As already noted, many colonies had tried, unsuccessfully, to adopt the
English Act’s protections as their own. And, with independence, these same
states moved quickly to import the Act’s terms into their new legal
frameworks. Examples abound. To take one, by March of 1776, when South
Carolina inaugurated its new independent government, the State’s General
Assembly took up as one of its very first matters the adoption of an “Ordinance to vest the several Powers . . . formerly granted to the Council of Safety
in the President and Privy Council to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act.”243
During the war that followed, South Carolina would become one of several
states to enact suspensions of the protections associated with the Habeas
Corpus Act in order to address the threatened invasion of the British.244
Georgia provides another example. That state included in its Constitution of
1777 express provision that “[t]he principles of the habeas-corpus act shall be a
part of this constitution.”245 As though to drive home the point that the
241

Address to the People of Great Britain (Oct. 21, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTICONGRESS, supra note 235, at 81, 88; see also Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec
(Oct. 26, 1774), in id. at 103, 107–08 (reiterating same complaints).
242 See TYLER, supra note 23 (providing details and discussing case law turning on the
application of the Habeas Corpus Act during this period); Tyler, supra note 31, at 955–68
(providing details).
243 JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MARCH 26, 1776–APRIL 11,
1776, at 21, 24, 26 (A.S. Salley, Jr. ed., 1906).
244 An Ordinance to Empower the President or Commander-in-Chief for the Time
Being, with the Advice of the Privy Council, to Take Up and Confine All Persons Whose
Going at Large May Endanger the Safety of this State (Oct. 17, 1778), in 4 THE STATUTES
AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 458 (Thomas Cooper ed., Columbia, S.C., A.S. Johnston
1838).
245 GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX.
NENTAL
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English Act proved the basis of its Constitution’s habeas provision, Georgia’s
legislature also annexed verbatim copies of the Act to the original distribution of the 1777 Constitution.246
Additional examples of the Act’s influence during the early development of American law are widespread and include, as noted, the enactment
of suspensions in at least six states during the Revolutionary War, some of
which expressly displaced the protections associated with the “Habeas
Corpus Act,” as the suspensions adopted in Maryland and Pennsylvania
did.247 (It bears highlighting here, moreover, that the states directed suspensions at persons deemed to owe allegiance to the new country. By contrast,
British soldiers taken in arms were treated as “prisoners of war” who could be
held in a preventive posture and who were amenable to exchange under the
Law of Nations.248)
In the wake of the war, a wave of state statutes adopted the terms of the
English Habeas Corpus Act in their own habeas corpus statutes, and more
generally, many states purported to adopt important British statutes and
common law practices by “receiving” them into state law.249 Arguably the
246 See CHARLES FRANCIS JENKINS, BUTTON GWINNETT: SIGNER OF THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 109 (1926) (“[T]he House . . . ordered, that 500 copies be immediately
struck off, with the Act of Distribution, made in the reign of Charles the Second, and the
habeas corpus act annexed . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
247 See Tyler, supra note 31, at 958–68 (detailing these suspensions); see also An Act to
Punish Certain Crimes and Misdemeanors, and to Prevent the Growth of Toryism, ch. 20,
§ 12 (Feb. 5, 1777), in 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 338, 340–41 (Virgil Maxcy ed., Philip H.
Nicklin & Co. 1811) (“The Governor shall have full power and authority to arrest . . . all
persons whose going at large the governor . . . shall have good grounds to believe may be
dangerous to the safety of this state, and the same persons to confine” and that “the habeas
corpus act shall be suspended, as to all such persons”); JOURNAL AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMON-WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 88 (John Dunlap, Phila.
1777) (providing that the Pennsylvania Assembly passed the suspension in order “to
restrain for some limited Time the Operation of the Habeas Corpus Act”).
248 See, e.g., 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 235, at
399–400 (Dec. 2, 1775) (“Resolved, That such as are taken be treated as prisoners of war,
but with humanity, and allowed the same rations as the troops in the service of the Continent. . . .”). Echoing Hale, Thomas Paine highlighted the importance of the lines of allegiance in his widely circulated pamphlet Common Sense. There, he argued that “[a] line of
distinction should be drawn between English soldiers taken in battle, and inhabitants of
America taken in arms. The first are prisoners, but the latter traitors. The one forfeits his
liberty, the other his head.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in I THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 43–44 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945). Additional discussion of how this distinction was drawn may be found in Tyler, supra note 31.
249 Maryland provides one example. The State clearly embraced the protections of the
seventh section of the English Habeas Corpus Act, given that its suspension legislation in
1777 expressly suspended “the habeas corpus act.” Operation of the Act likely derived from
the State’s recognition of its force through either or both its 1776 Constitution, which
declared that the people are entitled to “the benefit of such of the English statutes” both
by reason of their enactment as well as their “use[ ] and practi[ce] by the courts,” MD.
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights ¶ 3, and reception statutes, including a 1771 statutory resolution laying claim to the common law and such English statutes “as are securita-
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most significant of those adoptions took place just three months before the
Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787, when New
York passed a statute practically identical to the 1679 English Habeas Corpus
Act. The New York statute, embracing the seventh section of its English
predecessor, made express the requirement that any person “committed for
any treason or felony” who is not “indicted and tried [by] the second term
[of the] sessions of oyer and terminer, or gaol delivery, after his commitment
. . . shall be discharged from his imprisonment.”250 As in England in 1679,
moreover, the incorporation of the Habeas Corpus Act’s protections often
(though not always) resulted from legislative action.251
Highlighting the pervasive influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act
on the development of early American law, the great New York jurist and
legal scholar Chancellor James Kent observed in 1827 that “the statute of 31
Charles II. c. 2 . . . is the basis of all the American statutes on the subject.”252
Along the same lines, Justice Joseph Story wrote in his famous Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States that by 1833 the English statute “has
been, in substance, incorporated into the jurisprudence of every state in the
Union.”253 In short, the story of the development of early American habeas
law is one that underscores the commitment of the Americans to adopt the
English Habeas Corpus Act as their own.
The profound influence of the Act upon the development of early
American habeas law also extended to the Constitutional Convention. I
explore this influence at length in other work;254 here, I will simply highlight
a handful of the many pieces of evidence revealing the Act’s continuing centrality to the story of the privilege. First, Alexander Hamilton celebrated
(and, of course, promoted) the proposed Constitution in the Federalist Papers
specifically for “provid[ing] in the most ample manner” for “trial by jury in
criminal cases, aided by the habeas corpus act.”255 Second, Luther Martin, one
of the few other Convention delegates who also wrote and spoke about the
draft Suspension Clause (albeit critically), described the Clause as bestowing
the power on the federal government to “suspend[ ] the habeas corpus
tive of the Rights and Liberties of the Subject . . . .” 63 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND,
PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, 1771, at 81 (1946).
250 An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Citizens of this State, and for
Prevention of Imprisonments (Feb. 21, 1787), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 369,
371–72 (New York, Thomas Greenleaf 1792). As Chancellor Kent noted in his Commentaries, “[t]he substance of [New York’s] statute provisions on the subject . . . closely followed”
the terms of the English Act. KENT, supra note 158, at 24.
251 This is not to say that judicial action did not prove, in some states, as the means by
which these protections came to be imported into early state law. To the contrary, in some
circumstances judicial adoption and/or confirmation of the protections was often crucially
important, but this was likely because of the Privy Council’s regular practice of vetoing
legislative efforts to adopt the Act. For more details, see TYLER, supra note 23.
252 KENT, supra note 158, at 24.
253 3 STORY, supra note 206, § 1335, at 208.
254 See TYLER, supra note 23; Tyler, supra note 31, at 969–75.
255 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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act.”256 Third, during an important early Suspension Clause decision, Chief
Justice John Marshall instructed that in construing the provision one must
look to “that law which is in a considerable degree incorporated into our
own,” after which he went on to emphasize the importance of the “the celebrated habeas corpus act” of 1679 as complementing the common law writ and
“securing the benefits” that the writ was originally designed to achieve. As he
observed:
The English judges, being originally under the influence of the crown,
neglected to issue this writ where the government entertained suspicions
which could not be sustained by evidence; and the writ when issued was
sometimes disregarded or evaded, and great individual oppression was suffered in consequence of delays in bringing prisoners to trial. To remedy this
evil the celebrated habeas corpus act of the 31st of Charles II. was enacted, for
the purpose of securing the benefits for which the writ was given.257

Finally, many decades later, in an important habeas decision handed down
during Reconstruction, the Supreme Court again highlighted the Act’s
importance to the story of the Suspension Clause, pointing to the Act as
“firmly guarantee[ing]” the “great writ” and highlighting that the Act of
Charles II “was brought to America by the colonists, and claimed as among
the immemorial rights descended to them from their ancestors” who then
gave it “prominent sanction in the Constitution.”258
VII. HABEAS CORPUS MODELS

IN

MODERN JURISPRUDENCE

Over time, the extensive influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 on the development of early American law has been largely overlooked
in the debates that surround the United States Constitution’s Suspension
Clause. But the Act—and particularly the protections associated with its seventh section, which limited detentions of persons who could claim the protection of domestic law to those predicated upon timely trial on criminal
charges—proved enormously influential upon early American thinking
about the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The same may be said of the
concept of suspension, which Parliament created for the very purpose of displacing the Act’s prohibition of detentions of prisoners held “for matters of
state” (as Coke referred to them).259 Veneration of the Habeas Corpus Act
was commonplace in early American popular and political discourse. This
dialogue, in turn, set the stage for the Constitutional Convention that
adopted a provision specifically embracing the very suspension model that
Parliament had created—which, of course, connected back to the Habeas
256 Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia (1788),
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 19, ¶ 2.4.72, at 62 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981) (emphases omitted).
257 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830).
258 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) (emphasis added).
259 See 2 INSTITUTES, supra note 54, at 51.
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Corpus Act. The Founding generation understood the British suspension
model all too well, having been subjected to a series of parliamentary suspensions directed exclusively at American “Rebels” during the Revolutionary
War.260 Because the Founding generation both venerated the Habeas
Corpus Act and appreciated the dramatic nature of suspension, it constitutionalized strict limitations on when this dramatic emergency power would
be permitted—specifically countenancing suspension only “when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”261
All of this suggests that understanding the origins of and context within
which the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 came into being has a great
deal to contribute toward our understanding of what the Founding generation hoped to achieve when it included the Suspension Clause in the Constitution. And if, as Chief Justice Marshall believed, history is highly relevant to
how we should interpret and apply that Clause, then recovering the Act’s
influence on early American habeas law has the potential to contribute significantly to modern debates over the meaning and reach of the Suspension
Clause.
To that end, any discussion of the Suspension Clause today must
account for the enormously important role that the English Habeas Corpus
Act has played in Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence. It is equally important, moreover, to recognize that the Act constituted statutory law that Parliament adopted for the very purpose of limiting the scope of lawful detention
by the executive and constraining judges to uphold those limitations on executive detention unless and until Parliament suspended them. That is, Parliament understood the Act’s mandates to control unless Parliament itself took
the dramatic step of suspending the Act. In other words, judges were not
free to disregard the Act, even in times of war.262
Returning to where we began, there is much in this history to suggest
that a common law model does not provide a full descriptive account of
Anglo-American habeas law as a historic matter given the enormously influential habeas privilege associated with the Habeas Corpus Act.263 To be sure,
this is not to deny that there have been many significant common law devel-

260 See An Act to Impower his Majesty to Secure and Detain Persons Charged with, or
Suspected of, the Crime of High Treason, Committed in any of his Majesty’s Colonies or
Plantations in America, or on the High Seas, or the Crime of Piracy 1777, 17 Geo. 3, c. 9
(Gr. Brit.); 35 HL JOUR. (1777) 78, 82–83 (Gr. Brit.) (noting royal assent given March 3,
1777). Parliament extended the Act throughout the War. See Tyler, supra note 29, at
677–78 & n.201.
261 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
262 For extensive discussion of parliamentary suspension debates highlighting how seriously the participants took displacing the Act’s protections, see Tyler, supra note 31, at
934–51.
263 Put another way, given the importance of the Habeas Corpus Act in Anglo-American jurisprudence, it is fair to question the assertion that a common law model has “dominated” historically. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2033, 2043.
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opments in habeas jurisprudence over that same history,264 some of which
are detailed in the story above. (One must recall, for example, that the statutory privilege associated with the Habeas Corpus Act harnessed the common
law writ to enforce its terms and that some states incorporated the Act’s protections through judicial decisions.) It is also true that the common law
model has much to commend it as a normative matter. For example, such a
model can adapt in order to address the myriad questions on which history
will not provide clear guidance.265 This is because the common law model
contemplates that judges possess some discretion to mold and remake habeas
law as they believe is warranted by ever-changing experience and circumstances. Along similar lines, moreover, the common law writ has also
accounted for the expansion of habeas protections into new realms, both
substantive and geographic.266
Nonetheless, studying the origins of the Anglo-American habeas privilege reveals that one of the most important and influential developments in
Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence was born out of statutory law enacted
by Parliament for the very purpose of constraining not just the executive, but
also the royal courts. In other words, this history suggests that those habeas
protections associated with the Habeas Corpus Act were designed to be fixed
and subject to displacement solely at the hands of Parliament through suspension legislation. Put another way, the history of the Act and its extensive
influence over the development of habeas law suggest that an “Agency
Model” describes many important developments in habeas jurisprudence.267
If indeed the Founding generation incorporated this same model into
the Suspension Clause, as the evidence suggests they did, and that choice
should wield some measure of influence over how the Clause is interpreted
today—two related, but very much separate propositions—then this history
has the potential to contribute significantly to a range of modern Suspension
Clause debates. There is a robust debate on the importance of history in
constitutional interpretation generally268 and in federal courts jurisprudence
specifically.269 (No one seriously questions that history might be relevant to
constitutional interpretation; modern debates instead turn on how much
influence it should wield.) In my own work, I have written that “in undertaking historical inquiry in the field of federal courts, one must be careful about
264 As noted earlier, Paul Halliday’s important work details these developments extensively. See generally HALLIDAY, supra note 9.
265 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2043–45 (setting forth some of the benefits of
the common law model). This point is important insofar as arguably there are many such
questions that may come up as part of the war on terrorism.
266 See generally HALLIDAY, supra note 9 (demonstrating the point).
267 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2033 (discussing the “Agency Model”).
268 This question has provided fodder for a massive amount of scholarly literature that
space constraints do not permit me to discuss here.
269 Two of the best contributions on this question came by the pen of Professor Fallon.
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753 (2015); see also, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1046–47 (2010).
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assigning certain data points from the Founding period determinative
weight, rather than treating them as part of a larger conversation about the
role of the judicial power in our constitutional framework.”270 This being
said, there are reasons to think that the extensive historical backdrop to the
Suspension Clause is worthy of careful consideration in explicating its meaning, and not just because John Marshall said so (though that is certainly one
good reason). To begin, modern Supreme Court case law, including the
majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, points to history as an important
guide271 and the Suspension Clause “enshrine[s] terms of art that had wellsettled meaning in English law at the time of the Founding.”272 In this
respect, the Clause by its very terms invites attention to the English legal
backdrop, not unlike the Seventh Amendment’s text, which “preserve[s]” the
civil jury-trial right as it was known “at common law.”273 Finally, by setting
the privilege off against suspension, the Suspension Clause both embraces
the English suspension model built on the English Habeas Corpus Act and
stands as the Constitution’s only “express provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis.”274
If history is indeed relevant to how courts interpret the Suspension
Clause, the material unearthed here may have much to contribute to some of
the questions at the heart of modern debates. Consider, for example, some
of the important habeas cases that have arisen out of the war on terrorism. I
have in mind specifically the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.275 Hamdi involved a native-born United States citizen who was captured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 and turned over to the
United States military. At the hand-off, the Northern Alliance reported that
it had captured Hamdi fighting with the Taliban. The military transported
Hamdi to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where it detained many persons captured
in the ongoing war on terrorism. At that point, when it learned that Hamdi
was a citizen, the government transferred him to two different military detention facilities on domestic United States soil. All the while, the government
labeled Hamdi an “enemy combatant” and detained him in the absence of
criminal charges. Hamdi’s father filed a habeas petition on his son’s behalf
challenging the lawfulness of the son’s detention, and in time the Supreme
Court took up the case for review.
270 Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: A Word of
Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2015).
271 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (“‘[A]t the absolute minimum,’
the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted
and ratified.” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001))); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at
301 (“[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in
1789.’” (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996))).
272 Tyler, supra note 31, at 920.
273 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”).
274 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). I elaborate on some of these points in Tyler, supra note 31, at 918–23.
275 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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Before the Court, the government argued that Hamdi was not entitled
to independent review of his classification as an “enemy combatant” or his
detention on that basis. Hamdi’s lawyers, by contrast, argued that as a citizen, he could not be detained outside the criminal process in the absence of
a suspension. A fractured Court reached a holding that embraced neither
position and instead fashioned a habeas remedy to the particular facts and
circumstances of Hamdi’s case. Specifically, in a plurality opinion by Justice
O’Connor, the Court sanctioned the idea that “[t]here is no bar to this
Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.”276 In other
words, the Court concluded, there is no constitutional bar precluding military detention on American soil of a citizen without criminal charges and
timely trial—even when undertaken in the absence of a suspension.
All the same, Justice O’Connor’s opinion recognized that “detention
without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception’” in our constitutional tradition.277 This, in turn, led her to conclude that a citizen detained as part of
the war on terrorism is entitled to “a meaningful opportunity to contest the
factual basis” for his classification as an enemy combatant “before a neutral
decisionmaker.”278 In fleshing out what such a hearing would entail, Justice
O’Connor’s opinion posited that the appropriate framework should
“balanc[e] [the] serious competing interests” at stake, specifically “‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest.”279 In Hamdi’s case, Justice O’Connor believed that
such balancing must account for the fact that the government interest in
preventing persons captured in battle from returning to the battlefield is significant. Her opinion also put considerable stock in the fact that Hamdi had
been captured overseas.280 Further, in discussing which measures could satisfy due process considerations, Justice O’Connor declined to rule out that
the government could rely upon hearsay evidence or that the relevant hearing could be provided in a military tribunal.281
276 See id. at 519 (plurality opinion). Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined in full by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Justices Souter and Ginsburg
concurred, although their cursory explanation stating why they joined Justice O’Connor’s
opinion obscures whether they agreed with this and other points in her opinion. See id. at
553–54 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
277 Id. at 529 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987) (upholding pretrial detention pursuant to the Bail Reform Act against due process
challenge)).
278 Id. at 509.
279 Id. at 528–29 (quoting and relying upon Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
280 See id. at 531; see also id. at 523 (observing that Hamdi had been “captured in a
foreign combat zone”).
281 See id. at 533–34 (“Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.”); id. at 538 (“There
remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”).
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In dissent, Justices Scalia and Stevens protested that in the absence of a
suspension, the United States Constitution prohibits the government from
detaining a citizen in a posture akin to a prisoner of war.282 Put another way,
without a suspension, the dissent argued, the Constitution requires that
“[c]itizens aiding the enemy [be] treated as traitors subject to the criminal
process.”283 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent relied extensively on the
role of the English Habeas Corpus Act in Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence and its historical linkage with the concept of suspension.284
For many jurists and scholars, the fact that Hamdi had been captured
overseas in a battlefield setting was enormously significant, and it distinguished his case from another citizen enemy combatant case that arose during this same period, that of José Padilla.285 The United States government
took Padilla into custody at Chicago’s O’Hare airport under a material witness warrant stemming from the investigation into the attacks of September
11, 2001; one month later, after a presidential order declared him an “enemy
combatant” in the war on terrorism, the government transferred him to military custody, where he remained for several years.286 Padilla’s habeas case
also made it to the Supreme Court, but unlike Hamdi’s case, Padilla’s did not
produce an opinion on the merits.287
Professors Fallon and Meltzer “applaud[ed] the approach of the plurality opinion in Hamdi” and emphasized that a “crucial fact” was “Hamdi’s
seizure on a foreign battlefield.”288 Padilla’s domestic capture, by contrast,
in their view suggested that his detention in military custody without charges
was unconstitutional.289 In drawing these distinctions, moreover, Fallon and
Meltzer’s work highlights how the Common Law Model has the flexibility to
account for the circumstances of particular cases and give them differing
weight. By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi—which Fallon and
Meltzer labeled as emblematic of the Agency Model—did not allow for such
flexibility. In particular, they argued, Justice Scalia’s position was insufficiently sensitive to the fact that “the exigencies of seizure on a battlefield
make the demands of the ordinary criminal process too unyielding.”290
Here is where history might have something to add. If one approaches
the analysis of these two cases through a common law model that takes a
multitude of factors into account, there are many distinctions that may be
282 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 559.
284 Id. at 557–58.
285 For citations, see Tyler, supra note 31, at 1004 n.653.
286 For details, see id. at 912–13.
287 This is because the Court concluded that Padilla had filed his habeas petition in the
wrong jurisdiction. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004). When Padilla refiled his petition and it was before the Supreme Court anew on a petition for certiorari, the
government transferred him to civilian custody and indicted him on various criminal
charges. For details, see Tyler, supra note 31, at 913.
288 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 2, at 2036, 2072.
289 See id. at 2072–75.
290 Id. at 2072–73.
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drawn between Hamdi’s and Padilla’s situations. But stepping back, we
should ask if this is really the right starting point for assessing the two cases.
Historically, there is ample evidence to suggest that the two cases would have
been treated the same. To begin, Hamdi had long been held on United
States domestic soil by the time his case reached the Supreme Court and in
this respect, his situation was analogous to a host of historical examples in
which English and British subjects captured beyond the geographic reach of
the Habeas Corpus Act were then transported to and imprisoned on English
soil, at which point everyone took for granted that they could now claim the
protections of the Act. Those protections, in turn, promised such persons
the remedy of discharge unless they were timely tried on criminal charges or
detained under the imprimatur of a suspension. The historic analogues to
Hamdi’s case include subjects captured on the high seas fighting for the Jacobite cause while sailing under the French flag as well as those who fought for
the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War (and who the
British considered to remain, at least until independence became a foregone
conclusion, British subjects). In these cases and others, when the prisoner
subjects were brought to English soil for detention, it followed under prevailing political and legal understandings that such persons could not be
detained outside the criminal process in the absence of a suspension.291
In other words, by design, the framework created by the Habeas Corpus
Act was far less concerned with differences in circumstances between cases
than perhaps a common law model is. As detailed at length here, this result
followed in large measure because the Act was born out of a parliamentary
desire to constrain judicial actions that had been shown to under-protect liberty interests in exactly these kinds of cases—namely, those in which the
executive maintained that “interests of state” justified detention outside the
criminal process. If, in turn, the Founding generation incorporated into the
Suspension Clause the Act’s core protections found in its seventh section,
then there is reason to question whether factors like those said to distinguish
Hamdi’s and Padilla’s cases should be relevant to the Suspension Clause
inquiry today. Put another way, depending on the importance of this historical backdrop to modern constitutional interpretation, the influence and
application of the Habeas Corpus Act suggest that Hamdi and Padilla’s cases
should stand on equal footing. More generally, there is reason to question
how well a model that recognizes judicial discretion to disregard the Habeas
291 For details on the treatment of Jacobite supporters, see HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at
170–73 (detailing some Jacobite cases). For additional details relating to these examples,
see TYLER, supra note 23 (detailing cases arising during the Jacobite wars and American
Revolutionary War); Tyler, supra note 29 (discussing the Revolutionary War); Tyler, supra
note 31, at 1004–09 (discussing both historical analogues). As detailed in these sources,
such persons were not treated as prisoners of war but as domestic enemies of the state or
traitors. With respect to prisoners of war, as Paul Halliday’s work reveals, the Habeas
Corpus Act was of no help because they could not claim its protections. Put another way,
as Halliday’s survey of hundreds of cases during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
concludes, King’s Bench “never released a person it concluded had been properly designated as a POW.” HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 171.
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Corpus Act’s core protections, as arguably Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Hamdi did, stands up against this important chapter in the development of
Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence. My larger point is simply this: in tackling modern questions going to the meaning and application of the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, there is good reason to include discussion of the
English Habeas Corpus Act framework that governed during the century preceding the drafting of the United States Constitution in the larger discussion.
CONCLUSION
The material unearthed and recounted here has the potential to inform
not only questions raised in cases like Hamdi, but many other important
questions that arise under the Suspension Clause as well. These include
important separation of powers questions as well as questions going to who
may claim the Clause’s protections, its geographic sweep, and its relationship
to the laws of war. My contribution in these pages, chronicling the story of
an enormously important part of the development of Anglo-American habeas
law, is offered here in the hope that it will contribute to these debates going
forward.
The Dan Meltzer I knew loved to debate federal courts issues, and he
and I had many conversations about Hamdi in which we challenged one
another to think harder about the larger issues implicated by the case and
the war on terrorism more generally. I can think of no better way to honor
his memory than to have one more conversation with him by engaging with
his work on this subject.

